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Opiskelijavalintojen suunnittelu on herättänyt Suomessa paljon keskustelua, kun viimeaikaiset poliittiset päätökset 
ovat muuttaneet valintajärjestelmää keskitetympään suuntaan. Jotkut antaisivat korkeakoulujen itse päättää 
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pääsykokeita koskevaa empiiristä kirjallisuutta, tämä tutkielma pyrkii kuvaamaan niitä lukuisia tekijöitä, joita 
politiikantekijän täytyy huomioida opiskelijavalintoja kehittäessä. Todellisten mekanismien suunnitteluun hyvin 
soveltuvana kaksisuuntaisten pariutumismarkkinoiden kirjallisuuteen perehdytään syvällisesti.  
Niin sanottu student-proposing deferred acceptance –algoritmi osoittautuu parhaaksi valinnaksi, jos politiikantekijä 
kokee erityisen tärkeäksi, että mekanismi kannustaa hakijoita totuudenpuhumiseen, ja toisaalta valintakriteerinä 
käytettävää pisteytystä noudatetaan. Näin ainakin, jos korkeakoulujen ei uskota manipuloivan mekanismia. 
Käytännön mekanismit kuitenkin usein jättävät hakijoille joitain kannustimia raportoida todellisista eroavia 
preferensseja, hakijat saattavat raportoida epätosia preferensseja itselleen epäedullisesti, ja student-proposing 
deferred acceptance –algoritmissakin kaikkien mahdollisten hakukohteiden asettaminen preferenssijärjestykseen on 
vain heikosti dominanttia. Siksi ilmoitettuja preferenssejä ei tulisi ajatella suoraksi todistusaineistoksi hakijoiden 
preferensseistä.  
Korkeakouluille yhteiset pääsykokeet ylioppilastutkinnon muodossa voivat olla hajautettua järjestelmää 
kustannustehokkaampia, kun korkeakoulujen ei tarvitse kuluttaa resursseja erillisten pääsykokeiden järjestämiseen. 
Opiskelijoilla on kuitenkin sitten korkeammat kannustimet menestyä ylioppilaskokeissa, ja on jo näyttöä siitä, että 
ylioppilastutkinnon arvosanoja pyritään korottamaan entistä enemmän. Kokonaisvaikutus kustannuksiin jää siis 
epävarmaksi empiiriseksi kysymykseksi. Valmennuskurssien tärkeys vähentynee, mikä säästää yhteiskunnan 
resursseja ja lisää sosioekonomista tasa-arvoa. Toisaalta aikaisemmin elämässä tehtyjen valintojen merkitys 
korostuu, mikä saattaa heikentää sosioekonomista tasa-arvoa. 
Ylioppilastutkinnon tärkeyden korostuminen parantaa kannustimia ahkeraan opiskeluun jo lukio-opintojen aikana, 
minkä politiikantekijä voi nähdä hyödylliseksi. Vaikka yhteisiin pääsykokeisiin perustuva valintajärjestelmä 
parantaa huomattavasti opiskelijan mahdollisuuksia tulla valituksi toissijaiseen hakukohteeseen tultuaan hylätyksi 
ensisijaisesta hakukohteesta, jää empiiriseksi kysymykseksi, kuinka paljolti tämä vähentää uudelleenhakemista 
kilpailtuihin opiskelupaikkoihin. Tiettyihin korkeakouluihin kohdistuva ylikysyntä on suora seuraus hakijoiden 
preferensseistä, eikä ratkaistavissa millään mekanismilla, mikä antaa korkean arvon hakijoiden preferenssien 
tyydyttämiselle.  
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The design of college admissions has been a heatedly discussed topic in Finland, as recent government initiatives 
have led to a more centralized system. Some argue for letting colleges decide on their admissions procedures, while 
others believe that a centralized matchmaking procedure with priorities determined by the matriculation 
examination would be more cost-effective.  
This thesis aims to characterize various factors that the policy maker must take into account when designing a 
college admissions procedure, in light of existing theoretical research on both centralized and decentralized 
matching markets and empirical studies on social determinants of college choice and the capacity of entrance 
examinations to elicit information on student ability and motivation. The two-sided matching literature is discussed 
extensively because of its usefulness for designing centralized clearinghouses for matching markets. 
The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm emerges as the best choice for a policy maker who regards 
strategy-proofness and respecting of priorities as especially important, at least if manipulation by colleges is 
implausible. However, strategy-proofness is fragile in practical applications, applicants may try to manipulate also 
strategy-proof mechanisms and reporting the whole preference relation is still only weakly dominant. 
Consequently, satisfaction of reported preferences should not be taken as evidence of welfare properties of a 
matching without qualifications. 
The use of a common entrance examination may be more cost effective than a system based on college-specific 
entrance examinations, as colleges do not then need to spend resources on organizing the examinations. However, 
students have then stronger incentives to perform in the common entrance examination, and there is already 
evidence that more students retake the matriculation examination in Finland. The overall effect on the costs of 
organizing entrance examinations is an uncertain empirical matter. The importance of preparation courses is likely 
to decrease, which saves resources and contributes to socioeconomic equity. On the other hand, making students 
choose on their study paths earlier in life may erode socioeconomic equity.  
A larger role for the matriculation examination provides stronger incentives for showing effort in high school, 
which the policy maker may see as beneficial. While a system with a common entrance examination makes it 
possible for a student to get admitted to a second preference when she is rejected by her first preference, it remains 
an empirical question to what extent this reduces the propensity to apply again to competitive colleges. The excess 
demand for certain colleges is a result of student preferences and is not solvable by any mechanism that gives a 
strong priority to satisfying student preferences.  
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1   INTRODUCTION 
The optimal way of assigning applicants to colleges has gained much attention in Finland 
in recent years, both in academia and among political decision makers. The design of 
college admissions procedures vary a lot between countries. In some countries, such as 
the United States, universities are to a large extent independent from the state, both 
financially and in decision making, and the admissions procedure is largely decentralized, 
with each university making its own optimal admission decision. In other countries, such 
as Turkey and Germany, universities are more closely connected to the state, and the 
admissions procedure is run through a centralized clearinghouse. Finland has been 
traditionally a somewhat mixed case, with the universities largely financed by the state, 
but the admissions procedure being decentralized1.  
However, the state has pushed for a gradual transition towards a more centralized 
admissions system, first in the form of a centralized application procedure and recently 
by a more uniform and less costly admissions criteria. At the same time as the proportion 
of working age population relative to children and pensioners is dwindling, new high 
school graduates find it increasingly difficult to get admitted to higher education 
(Kalenius, 2018; OKM2, 2016), which is likely to further deteriorate the financial 
situation of the public sector in the future. In addition to generally increasing the average 
age of labor force entry, is also feared that many of those not able to continue their studies 
in higher education soon after graduation from high school face a significant risk of social 
exclusion (Ahola, Asplund & Vanhala, 2018). The programme of the government of 
Prime Minister Sipilä stressed the need to hasten the transitions from upper-secondary 
schools to universities and from university education to working life, and the government 
saw reforming of the college admissions system as an important way of reducing the gap 
years between upper-secondary and university education (VNK3, 2015, 2017).  
Colleges, especially those in high demand, have tended to employ demanding entrance 
examinations as the principal admissions criterion, with generally some but lesser 
weighting put on the grades of the standardized matriculation examination conducted by 
                                                 
1 As a curious fact, college admissions were decentralized in the Soviet Union (Hafalir, Hakimov, Kübler 
& Kurino, 2018). 
2 OKM stands for the Ministry of Education and Culture. 
3 VNK stands for the Prime Minister’s Office. 
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high school graduates. Pekkarinen and Sarvimäki (2016) proposed that the college 
admissions procedure should be mainly based on the grades of the matriculation 
examination, with entrance examinations mostly discarded because of their high costs. 
Reports commissioned by the Finnish ministry of education and culture concurred with 
these recommendations (OKM, 2016, 2017) and universities are currently in a process of 
transition towards a system with much less role for entrance examinations. 
The practicalities of college admissions provide also lessons for economists. College 
admissions is one example of matching problems that play a large role in the blossoming 
literature and practice of market design, which Roth (2018) defines as a field of 
economics that tries to ”understand how the design of marketplaces influences the 
functioning of markets”. Budish (2012) distinguishes matching problems from theoretical 
mechanism design by noting that while in the mechanism design literature the 
conventional objective is to find a mechanism that maximizes social welfare subject to 
technological and incentive constraints, in the matching literature, the goal is usually the 
more practical one of finding a mechanism (i.e. a matching procedure) that satisfies a 
number of properties seen as desirable by policy makers, such as efficiency and fairness. 
Roth (2018) also notes that in mechanism design, the policy maker is often assumed to 
have a complete freedom to install new mechanisms through which the economic agents 
have to operate, while the market design literature must, as more practice-orientated, to 
accept that real-life participants often have a lot of freedom to act outside of the 
marketplace, and consequently the designer of the marketplace cannot hope to have a 
complete control over the strategy-space of the participants.  
Matching markets are pervasive in modern societies and come in many forms. Aside from 
those allocating students to schools and colleges, matching markets include those for 
labor, marriage, housing and even organs. One exciting aspect of them is how they bring 
to the forefront issues of centralization versus decentralization both in decision making 
and marketplaces. Roth (1984) and Roth and Xing (1994) detail how decentralized 
matching markets can often be prone to unraveling, and how commitment to dealing via 
a centralized marketplace led in some cases to a more stable procedure4.  
                                                 
4 Even the ancient Greeks were no strangers to these questions: in the Republic, Plato famously proposed 
centralizing the marriage market along the lines of the so-called serial dictatorship mechanism, with the 
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A distinction between two main types of matching markets may be made. In two-sided 
matching markets, there are two sets of agents, and agents on one side of the market look 
for agents on the other side of the market to match with. In one-sided matching markets, 
or priority-based allocation problems, there is a set of agents to whom the policy maker 
allocates a set of goods. Another important distinction is between markets where transfers 
between markets participants are not allowed or are otherwise implausible, such as 
admissions to public schools, and markets for which transfers between participants are 
paramount, of which probably the most important example is labor markets. The starting 
point of the game-theoretic analysis of matching markets can be seen to be the seminal 
work of Gale and Shapley (1962). 
The theory of matching markets has found numerous avenues for further research from 
practical matching problems, usually with the focus on how poorly performing 
mechanisms could be improved, or on analyzing how a currently decentralized market 
would work, if a centralized clearing house was installed. Matching theory has even 
occasionally influenced those applications. The American doctor residency program for 
new physicians (the National Resident Matching Program, NRMP) uses a mechanism 
designed in Roth and Peranson (1999) while the authority responsible for the Boston 
Public Schools decided to change their school choice mechanism, explained in 
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005), largely because of the empirical evidence of 
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2006) and the experimental results in Chen and Sömnez (2006). 
Similarly, economists helped to redesign the New York public high school matching 
mechanism, as documented in Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak and Roth (2005). 
Maybe as the most famous application, the burgeoning literature on organ exchange 
problems (e.g. Roth, Sönmez & Ünver 2004, 2005, 2007; Ünver, 2010) has helped to 
launch several kidney exchanges. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sömnez (1998, 1999) and Sönmez 
and Ünver (2010b) consider the problem of allocating houses to tenants. Sönmez and 
Ünver (2010a) and Budish and Cantillon (2012) analyze the course allocation problem, 
in which students are assigned sets of college courses. Sönmez (2013) and Sönmez and 
                                                 
choices made in a serial order formed according to military merit. Though understandable from the 
viewpoint of encouraging good military performance, the modelling framework of section 3 (and intuition) 
will make it clear that such a mechanism would fail the requirement of stability, as the prospective spouses 
are unlikely to view themselves purely as objects to be allocated. Consequently, the mechanism would not 
be easily implementable.   
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Switzer (2013) propose improvements to U.S. Army caded-branch matching. As another 
entry-level labor market application, Dimakopoulos and Heller (2019) analyze the 
mechanism used in Germany for allocating lawyers to regional courts for trainee-ships. 
Matching markets with couples on the other side (e.g. Klaus & Klijn, 2005; Kojima, 
Pathak & Roth, 2013; Roth, 1984), markets with constraints on allocations (Kamado & 
Kojima, 2015, 2017a, 2017b) and matching with indifferences (e.g. Abdulkadiroğlu, 
Pathak & Roth, 2009; Abdulkadiroğlu, Che & Yasuda, 2015; Erdil & Ergin, 2008, 2017) 
provide interesting examples of how issues deemed important in practical applications 
have spurred substantial research towards more general models.   
Various national college admissions mechanisms have also been documented and 
analyzed in the market design literature. Westkamp (2013) discusses the German, Chen 
and Kesten (2017) the Chinese, Dur, Pathak, Song and Sömnez (2018) the Taiwanese, 
Balinski and Sömnez (1999) the Turkish and Aygün and Bó (2017) the Brazilian 
admissions mechanism. Aygün and Turhan (2017) discuss the mechanism used for 
admissions to engineering colleges in India and Hassidim, Romm and Shorrer (2017) the 
admissions to post-graduate studies in psychology in Israel. 
For wide-ranging literature reviews on the theory of market design, see Sönmez and 
Ünver (2011) and Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2013), and for surveys of existing 
applications, see Biró (2017) and Kominers, Teytelboym, and Crawford (2017) and 
specifically Ashlagi (2018) for a review of applications in health care. Roth (2002, 2008a, 
2018) offers a non-technical discussion on market design and historical experiences of 
markets both evolved and designed, and Roth (2015a) presents market design for a 
general audience. Biró and Klijn (2013) provide a literature review on matching with 
couples and Pathak (2011, 2017) on school choice applications. Kojima (2017) 
concentrates specifically on the recent theoretical developments that have been driven by 
empirical findings. Finally, Chiappori and Salanié (2016) discuss the econometric 
approaches used to analyze empirically various kinds of matching markets. 
Duflo (2017) maintains that economists should pay more attention to details of policy 
application and the institutional setting, and not just dismiss questions concerning specific 
applications as trivialities that do not affect the general principles derived from abstract 
models or as something that officials and policy makers are easily able to work out. On 
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the contrary, the fine details often determine whether the reform in question achieves the 
goals set to it at all, and Duflo believes that economists are in many cases well-positioned 
to work out the policy implementation (“plumbing”) in addition to providing the general 
framework. The issues confronted in the practical implementation of college admissions 
procedures provide another case study on how the details abstracted away in theoretical 
models need to be considered in practical market design. 
While such issues are easy to sideline in theoretical literature, designers of real college 
admission mechanisms must also choose between different normative objectives. College 
admissions procedures confront the usual welfare economic problems of preferences, 
choices and welfare. However, because choices between different educational paths have 
so large effects on individual welfare, these questions become even more daunting than 
in the context of most other goods. It is also clear that admission mechanisms cannot be 
designed separately from other institutions, but considered in conjunction with questions 
concerning the autonomy of universities and the optimal high school curriculum. 
Lately economics, and the field of market design in particular, has attracted some critical 
attention from political philosophy (Nussbaum, 2016, Sandel, 2012; Sandel, 2013) for 
market reasoning creeping into new areas social interaction and economists in general 
having a limited and unsophisticated approach to welfare evaluations. Though economists 
tend to be uneasy about engaging in moral reasoning, Atkinson (2009) maintains that 
economics cannot help dealing with normative theories. Roth (2007) believes that 
economists should take widely held normative judgements such as repugnance towards 
organ trade as a given constraint on market design, rather than try to change the public 
morality. Li (2017b) takes a step further and argues that market designers need to have a 
position of informed neutrality towards reasonable normative theories, meaning that 
normative analysis should not rely solely on preference utilitarianism.  
This thesis aims to characterize the college admissions problem to understand how the 
existing economic theory may help in guiding public policy on the issue, and to shed 
some light on the issues that confront designers who try to apply lessons from theoretical 
matching models on the practice of matching markets, and what further research is still 
required. We provide a context for the review by discussing the Finnish college 
admissions procedure. This may be seen as the plumbing approach to the design of college 
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admissions procedures. The topic is important because of the large role college 
admissions play in allocating talent among different subjects and industries in any modern 
society, and the interest that the general public have in that this allocation is done 
efficiently and fairly. No such review, incorporating both recent theoretical research and 
empirical evidence, has been done. 
A distinction should be made between two different uses of the term ‘college admissions 
problem’: above I used it in its wider, more practical sense, while below we will also 
discuss it as a one kind of a model analyzed in the matching literature. For the sake of 
readability, we will often call college programs, or college faculties, simply colleges. As 
a slight abuse of terminology, we often use the terms mechanism and algorithm 
interchangeably, though mechanism can also be understood to refer more widely to the 
institutional setting through which the matching takes place, including the algorithm used 
to calculate the matchings.  
The Finnish upper secondary education has a dual structure of separate schools for 
vocational education and general, academy-oriented education, the latter of which we 
may call high schools. While also those who have completed vocational studies are 
eligible for higher education, we will for brevity focus on the college admissions of high 
school graduates, because high school graduates form an overwhelming majority of 
applicants to colleges where the number of applicants relative to the student intake is very 
high. 
We start by briefly going through the Finnish institutional setting and the current changes 
to it in section 2 and outline central theoretical results from the matching market literature 
relevant for designing a clearinghouse in section 3. Section 4 contains a discussion on the 
aims of a college admission mechanism and the normative constraints that usually shape 
such procedures, some consideration on the welfare economics of college admissions and 
models of decentralized markets. Section 5 concludes. 
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2   THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND  
This section will first briefly and informally discuss the supply and demand of higher 
education in Finland, and then the current admissions procedure used and the most 
important recently implemented changes to it.  
2.1   Supply and demand of higher education in Finland 
Around 150 000 applicants apply for higher education in Finland annually, but colleges 
have capacity to grant degree places to only around one-third of them. While the amount 
of new high school graduates has decreased during the last two decades and currently 
around one-fourth of them does not apply to college in the year of their graduation, and 
there are currently around 1.5 times as many degree places available as there are new high 
school graduates, the proportion of new graduates obtaining a degree place at a college 
for the next academic year has decreased sharply, from 43% in 2007 to 28% in 2017. 
(Ahola et al, 2018; Loukkola & Tuononen, 2019). The increase in the proportion of the 
labor force with a college degree has stalled as a result: a young adult aged 25-34 was 
less likely to have college degree in 2016 than in 1998, meaning that concerning the 
proportion of young adults who have completed a degree in higher education, Finland is 
starting to sink under the average in OECD countries (Kalenius, 2018).  
2.1.1   Demand of higher education 
The proportion of new high school graduates not applying for college has actually slowly 
decreased (Ahola et al, 2018), so the statistical probability of a new high school graduate 
obtaining a degree place for the next academic year has decreased significantly. In 
principle, this could signify not so much increasing difficulties in getting admitted but a 
decreasing willingness to continue studies the same year and therefore heavily invest in 
passing an entrance examination, and an increasing willingness to take gap years, possibly 
to gain some work experience and decide on the choice of education. In fact, TAT (2018) 
report that the proportion of new high school graduates planning to take a gap year has 
increased by half from 20% in 2014 to 30% in 2018, and 28% of third year high school 
students are still uncertain of their higher education application choices. However, causal 
relations are difficult to determine, because the increasing propensity to take gap years 
could be the result of either decreasing willingness to continue studies straightaway or an 
12 
  
understanding of the fact that getting admitted to a popular college program has gotten 
increasingly difficult, and getting admitted could take several attempts.  
In any case, a central reason for the decreasing admittance rates seems to be that the 
demand for degree places has at the same time been steadily increasing: while 
approximately 110 000 applied to higher education in 2000, the number has climbed by 
40 000 within two decades. On top of the new high school graduates, many of the 
graduates of recent years that have not yet applied or succeeded to get admitted apply 
again, many of the recent graduates that previously accepted a degree place apply to some 
other college program, maybe because they need multiple attempts to gain a place at one 
of their more preferred colleges and spend the meantime enrolled in a less preferred 
program. They may also apply again because their preferences have evolved, and even 
some who have already completed a degree apply again, probably largely for the same 
reasons and because of labor market conditions. The number of foreign students in 
Finnish colleges has also increased over time. On the other hand, the number of Finnish 
high school graduates looking for education abroad has increased. (Ahola et al, 2018).  
In 2016, 27% of college applicants had a previous higher education degree or a degree 
place (Karin-Oka, 2017), while new high school graduates constituted a similar 
proportion, around one-fourth of all applicants (Ahola et al, 2018). Ahola et al. conclude 
that new high school graduates are not underrepresented as a fraction of admitted 
students. On the contrary, they find that on average, new high school graduates have a 
higher statistical probability of getting admitted compared to other groups. However, it is 
clear that those switching between programs or looking for another degree have 
contributed significantly to the present situation where a large proportion of the new high 
school graduates do not get admitted. 
There is also a wide dispersion in the demand that different college programs face: degree 
places medicine and law are highly contested, while some, such as natural sciences and 
mathematics, find it difficult to fill their seats (Ahola et al, 2018). For example, only 
around 4% of applicants got admitted to medical school and around 5% to law school in 
2018 (Studentum, 2019). Of applicants looking for a degree place in medicine, 40% 
already had a college degree or a degree place in some other program (Karin-Oka, 2017), 
highlighting the fact that some applicants are willing to use considerable periods of their 
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lives pursuing their preferred education. The eagerness of new high school graduates to 
study in a university has increased, while the attraction to continue in a university of 
applied sciences has decreased (TAT, 2018), which might point to the direction that 
young people are increasingly planning on applying to programs in high demand. 
2.1.2   Supply of higher education 
Historically, it has been seen important to maintain the independence of universities from 
the state, and according to the law (Universities Act 558/2009, Universities of Applied 
Sciences Act 932/2014), universities have a wide autonomy in deciding on their student 
intake and the curriculum. However, universities are largely financed by the state, and the 
supply of higher education is largely determined in negotiations between the universities 
and the state, where the targeted number of finished degrees is specified for different 
study sectors. The universities then decide on the number of their degree places based on 
the degree targets and other factors, while state aid encourages them to meet the targets 
but not to exceed them (the universities are paid per degrees finished up to the target 
number). (OKM, 2016).   
As discussed most recently in OKM (2015), the targeted numbers of degrees are decided 
based on the expected demand for different kinds of labor and the targeted industrial 
structure. The estimation process is done approximately every four years, usually once 
per an electoral term of the parliament (Kalenius & Karhunen, 2018). The currently used 
estimate of the labor demand is computed by Ahokas et al. (2015). The results are 
regularly criticized as inadequate. For example, Karhunen (2019) recommends generally 
increasing the supply of degree places, and Kotamäki (2019) specifically recommends 
increasing the intake of medical schools. 
Kalenius and Karhunen (2018) criticize the supply determination process as opaque and 
report that while the estimates of the future demand for labor with vocational education 
and the demand for highly educated labor have fluctuated, the relative share of estimated 
demand for highly educated labor has gone down during the last two decades. While the 
policy makers like to announce targets of higher shares of highly educated labor, they 
have often at the same time contracted the supply of higher education. For example, the 
government of Prime Minister Katainen reported to target the Finnish labor force to be 
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one of the most highly educated among the OECD countries by 2020 (VNK, 2011), but 
ended up reducing degree places in higher education (OKM, 2012b), as recommended in 
OKM (2011). The increase in the share of labor force with a college degree has been 
meant to be achieved by allocating a larger number of the degree places to those with no 
prior higher education.  
Kalenius and Karhunen (2018) conclude that policy makers have failed miserably in this, 
and the reductions in the supply of higher education have directly decreased rates of new 
high school graduates gaining a degree place. Consequently, in addition to the increasing 
demand for higher education, the growing difficulties new high school graduates 
encounter in entering higher education also result from policy decisions to decrease the 
supply of education. 
2.2   Recent changes to the Finnish college admissions procedure  
Reforming of the higher education system and the admissions procedure has been an 
objective of several previous governments. Ahola et al. (2018) discuss briefly the recent 
history of the Finnish college admissions procedure.  
Universities have traditionally employed entrance examinations to choose among their 
applicants. Already in the 1990s, the Ministry of Education commissioned studies 
(Halonen, 1994; Jussila, 1996) on extending the role of the matriculation examinations in 
the admissions procedure. It was deemed that the use of matriculation exam grades should 
be increased in subjects where it is applicable, having separate queues for students 
applying by admission examinations and those applying based on matriculation 
examination grades. However, Halonen and Jussila both advocated keeping a central role 
for admission examinations as a way of both ensuring that an applicant has the requisite 
skills for finishing her studies successfully and keeping open an alternative route to higher 
education. The objective of improving the position of new high school graduates was also 
discussed back then. 
Halonen (1994) also argued for a central application procedure which would include all 
the higher education programs in Finland, but largely due to opposition from universities, 
the joint college application procedure was established only in 2009, and in 2014 was 
extended to cover all undergraduate programs taught in Finnish, with some exceptions 
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(as decreed in 294/2014). In the centralized applications and admissions procedure, all 
student applications are processed through a centralized electronical marketplace, in 
which students are asked to present six of their most preferred college programs, colleges 
report their preference rankings over their applicants and the allocation is then calculated 
using the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962), 
which will be presented below. The procedure is ran every spring and autumn, but nearly 
all of the seats are allocated in the procedure that takes place in spring (OKM, 2016).  
While the allocation is done centrally, the law states that universities decide on their 
student admissions procedures, with some restrictions, and it also specifies the conditions 
that determine eligibility for higher education. Loosely speaking, eligibility for higher 
education can be achieved by passing the matriculation examination, completing a 
vocational degree or by having completed a foreign degree, which yields the right for 
higher education in that country.  
However, universities are left a large degree of freedom concerning student intake, as it 
is also mentioned that “eligibility for studies… may also apply to a person whom the 
university deems otherwise to have sufficient knowledge and skills for the studies”. 
Universities are allowed to set different admissions requirements for students with 
different educational backgrounds, but the admissions system must set the same 
requirements to those of similar educational backgrounds. As the most important 
example, those who have completed a vocational degree need not be treated in the same 
way as high school graduates who have passed the matriculation examination. 
In practice, colleges have traditionally formulated their preferences over students by 
heavily employing entrance examinations, with generally some but lesser weighting put 
on the grades of the matriculation examination. Some college programs, such as 
pedagogical studies, also utilize interviews. Usually colleges have multiple student 
queues, of which one is for those applying purely on the basis of the entrance examination 
points, one is for those applying based on combined points of the entrance and the 
matriculation examinations and possibly one for those applying purely on the basis of the 
matriculation examination points. Programs on the same subject located in different 
universities often coordinate by using the same entrance examination or even by keeping 
their exams on the same day, to block students from applying to multiple programs.  
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Another large change implemented in the recent years (in SA 256/2015 and SA 257/2015) 
is the requirement that colleges need to reserve some proportion of their degree places 
allocated in the joint application process for first-timers and introduction of a new transfer 
application system, in which those already in college can apply for switching to a different 
program. The proportion of seats reserved for first-timers is left for colleges to decide. 
The reasoning for this reform is given in the government’s proposal 244/2014:  
1. As more degree places are reserved for first-timers, more of them are selected, 
hastening the transition from upper-secondary education to higher education. 
2. Because accepting a degree place affects the applicant’s chances to be accepted 
in any future joint application process, the applicants are less likely to enroll in 
programs they do not intend to finish or utilize in the labor markets, and college 
seats are therefore more likely to be allocated to more motivated students.  
3. The excess demand for the degree places allocated in the joint application can be 
reduced by having a separate system for transfer applications for students that 
wish to change their major subject. It is admitted that this is unlikely to increase 
the number of total supply of degree places, but it is contended that the number of 
redundant rights to study would be reduced, decreasing administrative burden.  
Most recently, the government of Prime Minister Sipilä stressed the need for reforming 
the Finnish college admissions procedure, with the aim of lengthening the average 
working career by hastening the transition of new high school graduates to higher 
education (VNK, 2015, 2017). To this end, the government both recommended and 
financially encouraged universities to abandon costly entrance examinations in favor of 
an admissions procedure that employs mainly matriculation examination grades (OKM, 
2016), and in some sectors of education, colleges now select a much larger proportion of 
their students based on it (Ahola et al, 2018).  
For example, for the joint admissions procedure of spring 2019, business schools select 
60% of their students based on the matriculation exam grades, and the rest purely based 
on an entrance examination. Moreover, business schools reserve all of the seats in the 
matriculation examination quota for first-timers (Hyvönen, 2019). Similarly, medical 
schools will select 51% of their students and law schools 40% of their students solely 
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based on matriculation examination grades from 2020 onwards (Lääketieteelliset.fi, 
2018; Oikeustieteelliset.fi, 2019),  
While college admissions systems differ across countries, McGarth et al. (2014) note that 
in Europe, access to higher education is characterized by a reliance on secondary 
education qualifications as the main requirement for entry into higher education and 
centralized admissions procedures and decision-making. The belief that higher education 
is a right is also widespread, and therefore those that have completed the required 
background education are ensured a place at a college with no tuitions collected. This is 
manifested most obviously in the open access systems of, for example, Germany and 
France, where completing a secondary education degree yields immediate admittance to 
higher education, and the sorting of students to study paths most suitable for their abilities 
occurs during college studies, not before them.  
The recent trend in Finnish universities is also towards larger undergraduate programs, 
where the students’ choices concerning their field of specialization are meant to be 
confirmed during the studies with the help of student counselling: the hope is that this 
will reduce the need of switching between college programs and therefore reduce the 
pressure on the joint application process (OKM, 2016), but there is little evidence on the 
results so far. In any case, insofar as the most demanded programs, most importantly 
medicine, law, and business studies, are not seen as practical to be integrated to larger 
undergraduate programs, this is unlikely to reduce the pressure on them.  
In many other countries, most notably in the United States, obtaining a higher education 
is in comparatively costly (at least in out-of-pocket costs), and both the admissions 
procedure and the decision-making on the supply of education are decentralized. The 
increasing centralization, higher utilization of matriculation examinations and larger 
undergraduate programs then amount to a swift in the Finnish admission procedure 
towards a more standard European college admissions system, though McGarth et al. 
(2014) note that the current trend in Europe is to grant more autonomy to universities. 
2.3   The use of entrance examinations 
The transition from an entrance examination -based admission system towards 
admissions based on secondary education qualifications has instigated a lot of debate, 
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which Ahola and Spoof (2018) summarize. We discuss below the rational given for 
entrance examinations, and the costs caused by them.  
2.3.1   The rationale for entrance examinations  
Universities have preferences over their students, presumably because they want to train 
students as suitable as possible for the profession in question, but universities need 
information on their applicants to rank them. Of course, it is trivially true that there are 
mechanisms that are better than a weighted combination of the matriculation exam grades 
in discovering the true capabilities of the students. A college program with its numerous 
exams provides the college a ranking over its students. It answers the question of how 
suitable the students are for the studies relative to each other, and insofar as the program 
is good training for the profession, it also yields information on suitability for working in 
the profession. A good college program is therefore a good information revelation 
mechanism by itself, but prohibitively expensive for admissions purposes.  
The question is then of whether using some other information discovery mechanism than 
the matriculation examination grades yields a better tradeoff of information and 
resources, and how this might differ between subjects. According to OKM (2010, 2016), 
universities report that they believe entrance examinations to provide information on 
motivation and suitability of students for the studies in question, and that for many 
subjects, the high school curriculum does not introduce applicants to the topic in a 
sufficient manner for the applicants to make an informed choice among the educational 
possibilities, and that for the same reason, the matriculation exam does not make it 
possible for colleges to reasonably choose among the applicants. It is also contended that 
the grading of the matriculation examination does not sufficiently discriminate between 
students because of the coarseness of grading. Some colleges also report that students that 
are accepted based on the matriculation examination are less well prepared for the studies 
than those admitted by entrance examination, because preparing for an entrance 
examination requires studying the subject (Yle, 2019 June 15). 
How much additional information do college-specific entrance examinations provide 
over the information contained in secondary education qualifications? There is 
surprisingly little work towards understanding this topic. Ahola and Spoof (2019) review 
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the literature and find that generally, the correlation between performance in high school 
and performance in college studies (with respect to course grades) is moderate and larger 
than the correlation of college performance with success in entrance examinations. Both 
seem to be weaker in predicting the progression of studies than course performance. 
Consequently, there is little evidence of entrance examinations yielding more reliable 
information on student abilities. 
However, this question is very difficult to assess empirically. We would need to randomly 
allocate applicants to a group that must take the entrance examination and a group among 
which a subgroup of students is selected based on the matriculation examination grades, 
and then assess the relative performance of these groups in their studies. Difficult 
questions would still remain, as changes in the admissions system induce changes in the 
incentives of high school students, therefore affecting the abilities of the pool applicants 
(the allocation to treatment groups would then need to be done at an earlier stage, possibly 
at the start of high school studies). The intake of one college also affects the pool of 
applicants that the other colleges face, leading to unknown general equilibrium effects, 
which are what the policy maker is really interested in.  
Prime Minister Sipilä’s reform has also been criticized on the grounds that it confounds 
the autonomy of the universities (e.g. Hämeen-Anttila 2017; Jalovaara, 2017), implying 
either that letting universities have a free hand to decide on their admissions criteria is 
beneficial in terms of the compatibility of colleges and applicants or that autonomy of 
universities is an important value in itself, possibly trumping other concerns about societal 
outcomes. Many also believe that entrance examinations are required to give a second 
chance to students who did not do well in high school (OKM, 2016). When admittance 
to higher education is determined on the basis of secondary education qualifications, 
decisions made at the beginning of high school studies affect the probabilities of getting 
admitted to college, and Hämeen-Anttila believes that high school students are not yet 
mature enough to make informed choices between different educational paths. He even 
argues that if the government’s aims to reduce the costs of the college admissions system, 
it should rather seek to abandon matriculation examinations. 
Ahola and Spoof (2018) note that while reducing the average number of gap years 
between high school and higher education has been the main stated aim behind the reform, 
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the reasoning on how abandoning entrance examinations is going to allocate more seats 
to new high school graduates is weak. Ahola et al. (2018) comment that allocating seats 
based on matriculation examination grades will simply assign the sparse degree places to 
somewhat different students than what a system based on entrance examinations would, 
with little reason to believe that systematically more will be allocated to new high school 
graduates. Of course, one way to ensure that an arbitrarily high proportion of degree 
places will be allocated to new applicants is to set binding quotas to that effect, but 
universities have so far set the first-timer quotas too low to have much of an effect (Ahola 
et al, 2018), and there is some anecdotal evidence that giving first-timers a priority has 
reduced the propensity to accept places in programs other than students’ first preference 
(Yle, 2018 December 21), consequently even slowing the transition to higher education. 
Some less popular colleges also report that they organize entrance examinations 
principally as an yield control tool, as they believe that making application costly weeds 
out the applicants who apply but do not take up the seat they are offered (OKM, 2016), 
either because their plans changed in the meantime or they irrationally listed as acceptable 
a college they do not consider acceptable. There is little research that studies the extent 
of this phenomenon. In principle, this could be solved revenue-neutrally by making the 
applicants pay the college a deposit that would be returned with interest in every other 
case but when an admitted applicant does not take up a seat she is offered.  
2.3.1   The costs caused to applicants  
Pekkarinen and Sarvimäki (2016) and OKM (2016) discuss the costs of the entrance 
examinations system. In addition to administrative costs, there are the costs accruing to 
the applicants. The more competition there is for the seats, the higher is the time 
investment required from the applicant to have a given probability of getting admitted. 
This time could be used for working, studying something else or recreation. Assuming 
quite reasonably that people do not rank studying for an entrance examination very high 
as an occupation satisfying for its own sake, it entails both a monetary and psychological 
cost for the applicants.  
If it were so that the knowledge gained during the study process were highly generally 
applicable, yielding benefits for other entrance examinations or in the labor market, the 
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loss would not be great. However, the material studied for an entrance examination tends 
to be highly specific to the subject in question and of little use in examinations of other 
colleges. Because of this, for any two competitive entrance examinations and for nearly 
any student, studying for both makes it very probable that the student will pass neither. 
This produces congestion in matching markets: market participants cannot gather all the 
required information on the other side of the market before the market closes. The result 
is that the assignment is not optimal: some talented students who get rejected by a top 
college are left unmatched.  
In effect, entrance examinations amount to extension of the higher education curriculum 
outside of colleges, and the knowledge gained studying for entrance examinations then 
mostly benefits those who get admitted. It is sometimes argued (e.g. Jalovaara, 2017) that 
studying for a demanding entrance examination yields study skills required in higher 
education, but it seems unclear why such skills should be learned in the entrance 
examination phase and not in college, or already in high school. As noted above, 
universities also state they see entrance examinations as a way of providing information 
to students on the subject matter to help them choose on their career path, but in the case 
of the more competitive entrance examinations, seeing if the topic feels interesting at the 
phase of preparing for the examination is hopelessly late.  
Of course, not all entrance examinations are that costly. The less possibilities there are to 
prepare for the entrance examination, and the more the exam tests general skills, the less 
costs it is likely to impose on the applicants. Some colleges employ entrance examinations 
for which very little or none preliminary material is given, where the aim is to test general 
problem solving skills instead of the ability to learn subject material (OKM, 2016). 
However, matriculation examinations are similarly meant to test logical thinking and 
problem solving abilities, and it seems difficult to believe that such entrance examinations 
could yield much additional information on abilities. As mentioned above, interviews are 
used in some college programs. While this might not be very costly for the applicants, as 
interviews are presumably difficult to prepare for very extensively, this still spends some 
college resources, and the evidence on the ability of the interviewers to select the best 
among the applicants is weak (see Dana, Dawes & Peterson, 2013; DeVaul et al, 1987; 
Grove et al. 2000) 
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Medical schools have recently switched to using entrance examinations based on high 
school curriculum, which has long been common in technical colleges (OKM, 2016). 
Similarly, business schools currently allocate 40% of their seats by an entrance 
examination based on high school material (Hyvönen, 2019), and it therefore seems that 
the trend is towards less costly entrance examinations. However, this amounts effectively 
to testing the exact same skills in both the entrance and matriculation examinations, again 
raising the question of what additional information the colleges seek to gain by using such 
examinations. Law schools still employ entrance examinations that are based on law 
school material, likely reflecting their belief that the high school curriculum does not 
adequately reflect the competencies required for studying law. Arts schools will also 
continue to admit students based on applicable performances and work samples (OKM, 
2016).  
Concerning autonomy, it does not seem self-evident that self-seeking behavior by 
universities (or individual college programs) will result in the best possible compatibility 
between colleges and applicants on the aggregate level, nor that universities are likely to 
set admission criteria with eye on the best possible aggregate outcomes. For example, it 
seems likely to that the faculty staff in a medicine program are hoping to gain the best 
possible set of students for themselves, though the skill sets possessed by those students 
would be very useful also in engineering programs.  
More importantly, universities do not care about the costs accruing to the students: other 
things equal, a college will always prefer its new students to be more knowledgeable 
about the subject. Therefore, even if the matriculation examination grades contained 
practically all the same information about the candidates’ capabilities and suitability for 
the education as the entrance examination used, the university will prefer to employ the 
examination (as long as the costs from it do not exceed the benefit from students more 
acquainted with the topic), having no regard for the costs caused to the vast majority of 
students who do not get admitted.  
Of course, the only colleges likely to find demanding entrance exams on subject material 
beneficial are those that are in sufficiently high demand. This is because a highly 
demanded college will not be downgraded in its applicants’ preferences when the 
entrance examination gets more difficult (the cost of entrance examinations is a relatively 
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small matter for the applicants when they consider their likings over different educational 
paths) and the applicants are forced to learn the material carefully because of the 
competition.  
On the other hand, if colleges in less demand try to force applicants to study their 
curriculum in advance for the entrance examination, they are more likely find their 
applicants learning the material only superficially, either because applicants know that 
there is not much competition or because the college is not a first preference for them and 
they therefore cannot afford to use too much time preparing for the exam. This might 
explain why programs in high demand, especially medical, law and business schools, 
have tended to employ such entrance examinations, while seats in less demanded 
colleges, such as engineering schools, have usually been allocated by examinations 
focused on the high school curriculum or general logical abilities. 
2.3.3   Preparation courses 
In addition to its costs, the entrance examinations system is often faulted for the 
preparation course business that it encourages. Ahola et al. (2018) find that taking a 
preparation course seems to be associated with getting admitted even taking into account 
various background factors, and those with more educated parents are more likely to take 
preparation courses.  
However, the extent of a causal relation is left uncertain: maybe most importantly, the 
motivation to get admitted certainly differs between applicants and could increase the 
likelihood of both attending a preparation course and getting admitted, and Ahola et al 
(2018) have no obvious variable for controlling motivation (except maybe the reported 
previous school performance, but it is uncertain how high is the correlation between 
success in high school and the motivation to get admitted to a specific college program, 
when secondary education qualifications do not determine entry). 
Laukkonen (2018) also finds some evidence that high school graduates from low-income 
families are less likely to apply to highly selective programs, such as medicine, possibly 
reflecting lower financial means to enroll in preparation courses and take time off to 
prepare for the entrance examination. The preparation courses business that the admission 
examinations system encourages is therefore possibly less than ideal from the point of 
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view of equality of opportunity in education. However, Ahola et al. (2018) find no 
evidence of more expensive preparation courses yielding additional advantages over 
lower priced courses, nor of there being large regional differences in preparation course 
enrollment.   
Ahola et al. (2018) also note that statistically, attending a preparation course seems to 
generally lessen the expected gap in admittances between those with highly educated 
parents and those with less educated parents (i.e. applicants from less academic 
households have benefited more from taking a preparation course), from which they 
conclude that preparation courses might not confound equality of opportunity quite as 
much as often feared. However, this does not change the fact that applicants with more 
educated parents are more likely to attend preparation courses and hence, the existence of 
these courses contributes to children inheriting their parents’ educational level in the 
aggregate.  
The preparation course industry is also an artifact of the entrance examination system in 
the sense that it exists solely to extract resources from applicants, intensifying the 
competition for admittance. Of course, if matriculation examinations largely determined 
admittance to higher education, the preparation course business might switch to offering 
courses for high school students, and this is indeed something that is currently happening: 
in addition to preparation courses for matriculation examinations, courses are even 
offered to students in higher comprehensive school, marketed as helpful to get into well-
respected high schools, and there is some anecdotal evidence that  this corresponds to an 
increase in demand (Yle, 2019 April 3).  
While this might still present equity issues, at least then the preparation courses would 
contribute to learning the substance of the high school curriculum, and while there are no 
publicly funded preparation courses for entrance examinations (based on the subject 
material), high school itself serves as a preparation course for matriculation examinations. 
It is not self-evident that more contact teaching in the form of commercial preparation 
courses will have a very large effect on average, and it must be noted that the preparation 
course industry has an incentive to maintain the impression that their product is a 
necessity for leading a successful life. In any event, it does not seem likely that there 
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exists an admission mechanism that makes the well-off unable to leverage their higher 
wealth to get some additional preparation. 
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3   MECHANISMS OF COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 
This section starts by presenting the canonical college admissions model in conjunction 
with the closely related school choice and student admissions models. We discuss the 
most important and general results obtained for them in the literature and introduce then 
the more popular matching algorithms. We then proceed to discuss some recent 
theoretical advances, in particular some large matching market results, and also very 
briefly empirical work concerning preference estimation.  
3.1   The college admissions problem 
The mechanism design problem of matching students to schools admits a number of 
related but distinct approaches. Sönmez and Ünver (2011) make the distinction between 
the college admissions, student placement and school choice problems, or models. 
The traditional college admissions problem, first studied by Gale and Shapley (1962) and 
Roth (1985), is an example of two-sided matching market, where students look for 
colleges and colleges look for students. We have  
 a finite set of students S  
 a finite set of colleges C 
 for each college 𝑐 ∊ 𝐶, a capacity qc, 
 for every student 𝑠 ∊ 𝑆, a strict preference relation ≻s over colleges and 
remaining unmatched, 
 for every college 𝑐 ∊ 𝐶, a strict preference relation ≻c over groups of 
students (including singletons) and leaving seats unfilled, with the 
responsiveness property (Roth, 1985):   
1. for all 𝑠, 𝑠′ ∊ 𝑆 and S′ ⊂ S ∖ {s, s′ }, 𝑠 ∪ 𝑆′ ≻𝑐 𝑠
′ ∪ 𝑆′ if and only 
if 𝑠 ≻𝑐 𝑠
′, 
2. for all 𝑠 ∊ 𝑆 and S′ ⊂ S ∖ s, 𝑠 ∪ 𝑆′ ≻𝑐 𝑆
′ if and only if 𝑠 ≻𝑐 ∅, 
where the empty set ∅ denotes remaining unmatched.  
As a slight abuse of notation, we make no difference between a singleton set and the only 
member of it. We often refer to both students and colleges as agents, when there is no 
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need to make a distinction between the two sides of the market. The preferences are lists 
of acceptable agents on the other side of the market with the most preferred choice listed 
first, the next best as the second one and so on, with college c being acceptable to student 
s if 𝑐 ≻𝑠 ∅ and student s acceptable to college c if 𝑠 ≻𝑐 ∅. Clearly then, preferences are 
by assumption transitive and complete and hence, rational. The assumption that colleges 
have preferences over group of students, not only individual students, comes from the 
fact that we generally think of agents being primarily interested in their outcomes, not the 
parts that form that outcome. The colleges could also be defined to have more general 
substitutable preferences, see Roth and Sotomayor (1990: pp. 171-177). As student have 
preferences over colleges, not positions in them, we assume that students find all positions 
in the same college identical.  
It is also noteworthy that as no transfers of any kind are defined to be part of a matching, 
all aspects of the other side of the market that the agent deems relevant are reflected in 
the preference ordering, possibly including wages, tuitions, location and so on. The 
preference relations are ordinal, in other words they contain no cardinal information on 
preference intensities. The agents are also assumed to care only about their own 
outcomes: the preferences that students have over colleges are not influenced by whether 
their friends get admitted, though the stated preferences might be determined in part by 
expectations concerning how likely it is that they do.  
There are also no transfers between agents on the same side of the market, which would 
allow for agents to influence the preferences that others have over specific matches. So 
the preferences are exogenous and “final” in these senses. Also, responsive or more 
generally substitutable preferences ensure that colleges treat students as substitutes, not 
as complements, so the possibility does not arise that a college with preferences over 
individuals determined by ≻𝑐= 𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠3 would prefer the group of students {𝑠1, 𝑠2} to 
any other group, but would find s1 so worthless without s2 that it would prefer the group 
{𝑠2, 𝑠3} to the group {𝑠1, 𝑠3}. 
When all colleges have a capacity of one, the marriage market problem is obtained as a 
special case of the college admissions problem. The so-called related marriage market of 
a college admissions problem has proven to be a useful tool for reaching results for the 
college admissions model, though many of the conclusions obtained for the marriage 
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market do not generalize. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) contains a thorough discussion on 
the basic theory of two-sided matching.  
We call the triplet (𝑆, 𝐶, ≻), where ≻ = (≻s, ≻c), a college admissions problem, or 
simply an economy, when the context is clear. An outcome for the problem is a matching, 
that is, a function μ that maps every student to some college or back to himself or herself, 
when no match is found, and every college to a group of students no larger than its 
capacity, with the property that a student s is matched to college c if and only if college c 
is matched to student s. More formally, a matching is 𝜇: 𝑆 ∪ 𝐶 → 2𝑆 ∪ 𝐶  such that for 
any 𝑠 ∊ 𝑆 and 𝑐 ∊ 𝐶, 
1. |𝜇(𝑠)| ≤ 1 for all students 𝑠 ∊ 𝑆 and 𝜇(𝑠) ∊ 𝐶, 
2. |𝜇(𝑐)| ≤ 𝑞𝑐 for all colleges 𝑐 ∊ 𝐶 and 𝜇(𝑐) ∊ 2
𝑆, 
3. 𝜇(𝑠) = 𝑐 if and only if 𝑠 ∊ 𝜇(𝑐). 
We say that an agent i prefers a matching μ to another matching μ' if it likes the matches 
given to it under μ over the ones given to it under μ', that is, 𝜇(𝑖) ≻𝑖 𝜇′(𝑖). A matching μ 
is individually rational if no agent finds one of his matches under μ unacceptable, in other 
words, for all 𝑠 ∊ 𝑆, 𝜇(𝑠) ≻𝑠 ∅ and for all 𝑐 ∊ 𝐶, there is no 𝑠′ ∊ 𝜇(𝑐) such that 
𝜇(𝑐)\𝑠′ ≻𝑐 𝜇(𝑐), where the last requirement is by responsiveness equivalent to 𝑠′ ≻𝑐 ∅ 
holding for all 𝑠′ ∊ 𝜇(𝑐).  
A matching is stable if it is individually rational and there is no student s and college c 
such that s would prefer c to the college that the matching gave him, and c would prefer 
s to one of the students that the matching gave it, or s being acceptable to c and c having 
free capacity, as then s and c would constitute a blocking pair. Formally, there is no such 
𝑠 ∊ 𝑆 and 𝑐 ∊ 𝐶 such that  
𝑐 ≻𝑠 𝜇(𝑠), and  
𝑠 ≻𝑐 𝑠
′ for some 𝑠′ ∊ 𝜇(𝑐) if |𝜇(𝑐)| = 𝑞𝑐, or 𝑠 ≻𝑐 ∅ if |𝜇(𝑐)| < 𝑞𝑐. 
So a stable matching is blocked neither by some individual nor a blocking pair. Note now 
how important the assumption that agents only care about their own outcomes is. If 
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students would care about how the matching played out for their friends, the preference 
ordering after the market has reached a matching could differ from the preferences that 
the students had before the market opened, and matchings that would have been stable 
with respect to the original preferences could be unstable with respect to the new 
preferences.  
A number of important results that concern the set of stable matchings have been 
established for the college admissions problem. Gale and Shapley (1962) and Roth (1985) 
show that the set of stable matchings is nonempty for every college admissions problem 
with responsive college preferences and standard student preferences, and Roth and 
Sotomayor (1990: pp. 175 – 177) prove that a stable matching exists even if colleges have 
more general substitutable preferences. However, if there are no restrictions set on 
preferences of colleges, students’ preferences over colleges need to be aligned with each 
other in a certain strong sense (Dur & Ikizler, 2016). Roth (1984) also shows that if 
preferences of some students depend on outcomes of other students, the existence of a 
stable matching is not guaranteed.  
It needs to be noted that the assumption of responsiveness is not enough for preferences 
over individuals to determine unique preferences over groups of individuals. For the same 
strict preferences that colleges have over individual students, there are differing 
preferences over groups of students that are all responsive to those preferences over 
individuals. However, Roth and Sotomayor (1989) prove that for strict preferences over 
individuals, if a college prefers a stable matching μ to some other stable matching μ', then 
the college prefers every single student it gets under μ but not under μ' to every student it 
gets under μ' but not μ. The preferences that colleges have over groups of students 
matched to it under different stable matchings are in this sense unambiguous.      
Roth (1984) shows that when preferences over individuals are strict, the set of students 
who get a position and positions filled is the same at every stable matching. So a college 
that does not fill all its positions at some stable matching gets the same number of students 
at any other stable matching, and a student that does not get to college at some stable 
matching does not get chosen at any stable matching. Moreover, as a related result we 
have the so-called rural hospital theorem: 
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Theorem 1 (Roth, 1986). When preferences over individuals are strict, any college 
that does not fill all its positions at some stable matching is assigned precisely the 
same set of students at any other stable matching.  
What this means is that a college that is not generally highly appreciated among the 
students cannot hope that there would be some other stable matching where it would get 
a set of students that it likes better than the set it gets assigned at some given stable 
matching. If one would like to help such colleges, pushing the market to a different stable 
matching will not suffice: it has to be in the form of changing the preferences that students 
have for that college.  
There exists also a number of remarkable results on the welfare properties of matchings 
for the college admissions problem. A matching is called student-optimal if there is no 
matching that every student would find at least as good, and analogously for colleges. A 
student-optimal stable matching is then student-optimal in the set of stable matchings, 
and analogously for the college-optimal stable matching. Pareto efficiency, or Pareto 
optimality, or just efficiency, means that nobody could be made better off without 
somebody being worse off. Then Pareto efficiency for one side of the market means that 
nobody on that side of the market could be made better off without somebody on that side 
of the market being worse off. Weakly Pareto optimal matching for students is one for 
which it holds that not all students would be strictly better off at some other matching, 
though some subset of students potentially would, and analogously for colleges.  
Roth (1985) shows that for strict preferences, there exists a college-optimal stable 
matching that every college finds at least as good as any other stable matching, and a 
student-optimal stable matching that every student finds at least as good as any other 
stable matching. This is remarkable in that the interests of one side of the market are 
aligned in the sense that at the optimal stable matching, no agent on that side of the market 
would want to change to any other stable matching. Roth and Sotomayor (1990: 163) also 
show that the stable matching that is optimal for one side of the market is the worst stable 
matching for the other side of the market. However, Roth establishes also the following 
result: 
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Theorem 2 (Roth, 1985). When the preferences over individuals are strict, the 
student-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the students, but the 
college-optimal stable matching does not need to be even weakly Pareto optimal 
for the colleges. 
So for students, stability implies weak efficiency in the set of all possible matchings, but 
for colleges, the stable matching that is found at least as good as any other stable matching 
by all the colleges is not in general the best possible matching for colleges, in the sense 
of maximizing preferences: there could be some unstable matching that all colleges prefer 
to the college-optimal stable matching. 
These are only properties of a matching, which is just a way of pairing agents given some 
preference orderings taken as given. Nothing is said on how those matchings would come 
about, what the agents are allowed to do and what the agents know. If we think of the 
model, as is standard, as a game where both sides of a match must agree to it, we may 
expect unstable outcomes not to occur, or at least to swiftly unravel, as blocking pairs 
will form new pairs, blocking colleges will dismiss unacceptable students and blocking 
students will reject the position offered.  
It is also standard to assume that the preferences of the agents are private information that 
is known only to them. It is then natural to ask if the preferences that are observed in the 
market, however they may be inferred from the behavior of the agents, are the same as 
their true preferences. Do they act in a straightforward manner, always going after the 
one on the other side of the market that they prefer to the rest available, honestly stating 
their preference lists if asked? Suppose we have a well-ordered procedure for making 
matches, which only requires the participants to submit their preference orderings to some 
third party, which does all the work required for a matching to come about. Call such a 
procedure a mechanism.   
A mechanism is a function φ that gives a matching for every college admissions problem. 
We call a mechanism stable, if it always produces a stable matching and efficient, if it 
always produces a Pareto efficient matching. We also say that a mechanism is strategy-
proof if it makes it a dominant strategy for every agent to state their true preferences, that 
is, if truth-telling is the best response of every agent to any strategy combinations that the 
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other agents might choose, in any college admissions problem. It is important to note that 
a stable mechanism implements a matching that is stable with respect to the stated 
preferences, not the actual (unknown) preferences, and analogously for efficiency.    
Denote by Pi an arbitrary reported preference ordering of agent i and by P-i arbitrary 
preference orderings of the rest of the agents in 𝑆 ∪ 𝐶. Then let 𝜑(𝑃𝑖, 𝑃−𝑖)(𝑖) denote the 
match assigned to agent i under the matching that the mechanism yields when the reported 
preferences are 𝑃 = (𝑃𝑖, 𝑃−𝑖). Then for a strategy-proof mechanism φ, it holds for all 
agents i that 
 𝜑(≻𝑖, 𝑃−𝑖)(𝑖) ≻𝑖 𝜑(𝑃𝑖, 𝑃−𝑖)(𝑖),  
for arbitrary report Pi of agent i and arbitrary reports P-i of the other agents. In a college 
admissions problem with a mechanism specified, agents on both sides of the market 
submit preference lists and are therefore strategic agents, as the design of the mechanism 
determines the optimal strategy for an agent, given the beliefs that the agent has about the 
strategies of the others. It may also be assumed that capacities are only known privately 
by the colleges, and so colleges may also be asked to state their capacities. 
Roth (1982) shows that there is no stable matching mechanism that would be strategy-
proof. This is not difficult to prove: it suffices to write an example market for which every 
stable matching is such that some participant would have been better off by misreporting 
her preferences. Clearly then, any mechanism that yields one of those stable matchings is 
vulnerable to manipulation. Also, the following result shows that the two sides of the 
college admissions market differ fundamentally in this respect. 
Theorem 3 (Dubins & Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982). A stable matching 
mechanism that yields the student-optimal stable matching makes truth-telling a 
dominant strategy for all students. However, there is no stable matching 
mechanism that would make truth-telling a dominant strategy for every college. 
In particular, a matching mechanism that yields the college-optimal stable matching is 
not strategy-proof for the colleges. However, it is comforting to know that at least the 
students can be provided with incentives for truth-telling, because colleges (or schools) 
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are often public institutions in applications, and consequently their personnel may have 
less incentives or possibilities for taking advantage of the manipulability of the 
mechanism.  
The below limits-to-manipulations theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1987) 
shows that in a marriage market, participants who have only a single partner over all 
stable matchings cannot profitably manipulate a mechanism that implements a stable 
matching.  
Theorem 4. (Demange, Gale & Sotomayor, 1987). In a marriage market, let ≻ be 
the true (not necessarily strict) preferences and suppose that P are the reported 
preferences, where some coalition (of possibly only one member) misstate their 
preferences. Then there is no matching μ, stable for the reported preferences P, 
which is preferred to every stable matching under the true preferences ≻ by all 
members of the coalition. 
As a corollary of the theorem, if there is only one stable matching under ≻, then no 
participant can misstate his or her preferences to gain a preferred partner under any stable 
matching mechanism (all of which necessarily implement the sole stable matching). Of 
course, the result does not generalize to the college admissions problem, because of 
colleges’ incentives (Roth, 1985), but Roth (2015b, 2018) considers the theorem still 
helpful in understanding the empirical observation that stable matching mechanisms seem 
to be quite immune to manipulation in applications with a small set of stable matchings. 
Because of this, the size of the set of stable matchings is an important practical 
consideration for analyzing the incentives generated by a stable mechanism.  
We have two further results on the incentives of colleges. Regarding the reported 
capacities of colleges, we have the following result: 
Theorem 5 (Sömnez, 1997). No stable matching mechanism makes it a dominant 
strategy for a college to reveal its capacity in every college admissions problem. 
In particular, a stable matching mechanism that yields the college-optimal stable 
matching is not immune to manipulation via capacities.  
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Furthermore, we have another disappointing result concerning the possibility of 
preventing colleges and students from having incentives to circumvent the centralized 
matching by making pre-arranged matches. 
Theorem 6 (Kesten, 2012; Sönmez, 1999). There is no stable matching mechanism 
that is non-manipulable via pre-arranged matches. In fact, essentially no matching 
mechanism is non-manipulable via pre-arranged matches. 
The word essentially refers to the (very weak) requirement for there to be no matching 
mechanism that would be non-manipulable via pre-arranged matches, which is that there 
has to be more students than the capacity of any one of the colleges: 𝑛 = |𝑆| > 𝑞𝑐 for at 
least one 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 (Kesten, 2012). 
Theorems 4 and 5 may seem surprising, because we might expect that stability would 
precisely prevent such situations. However, Sönmez (1999) was inspired by the empirical 
findings that pre-arranged matches seem to occur in some centralized matching markets 
despite of the clearinghouses using stable matching algorithms (e.g. Roth & Xing, 1994). 
In any case, based on the theory, we would expect that centralized markets utilizing 
unstable mechanisms would tend to leave much larger incentives for strategic behavior, 
and consequently would exhibit more pre-arrangement of matches.  
Indeed, there is both empirical (Roth, 1991) and experimental (Kagel & Roth, 2000) 
evidence suggesting that stability of the matching mechanism used is an important factor 
for preventing the kind of unraveling described by Roth and Xing (1994), in which pre-
arrangements play a central role (see Roth (2002) for a discussion on the topic). There is 
also some anecdotal evidence that in the former, partly decentralized NYC high school 
choice plan matching mechanism some high schools stated capacities lower than actual, 
placing the rest of the students outside of the centralized matching process, evidently 
because the outcomes tended to be unstable (Abdulkadiroğlu et al, 2009; Roth, 2015a: 
pp. 106 – 110). 
3.2   The school choice and student admissions problems  
On the other hand, the student placement problem of Balinski and Sönmez (1998) and the 
standard school choice problem of Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) are cases of one-
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sided matching markets, or priority-based allocation problems, in which students look for 
school seats and school seats are simply (indivisible) objects to be consumed. Students 
are assigned to school seats on the basis of the preference lists they submit and priority 
orderings of the schools. As they are asked to state preference lists, students are strategic 
agents and so the question of whether a given mechanism is strategy-proof for students 
remains important. However, schools are not strategic agents, as the priority orderings 
that schools have over students are given by some fixed criteria, and the capacities of the 
schools are also taken as exogenously determined and publicly known. Consequently, 
also the situations of theorems 5 and 6 are assumed away.  
The student placement problem and the school choice problem differ in that in the student 
placement problem, the priorities of the colleges are given by a centralized admission 
examination, where each college belongs to one of several test categories, while in the 
school choice problem, the priorities are given by some, usually quite coarse, politically 
determined criteria. This distinction may seem somewhat artificial but has both 
theoretical and practical relevance, as the coarser criteria of school choice problems often 
make schools indifferent between various students, a situation that has serious 
consequences for stability and efficiency (Erdil & Ergin, 2008).  
We now denote the priority ordering of school c by πc to emphasize the difference 
between priorities and preferences. However, to keep matters simple, below we will 
generally refer to college preferences even when presenting results originally obtained in 
a priority-based allocation context. Allocation would also be a more correct term than 
matching in this context, but we will follow convention and use the terms 
interchangeably. The notation of the college admissions problem is used otherwise, and 
the rest of its assumption are kept. However, some new terms need to be defined. A 
matching μ is non-wasteful if whenever some student s prefers some college c to his match 
under μ, c has its capacity filled under μ: for all students 𝑠 ∊ 𝑆, 
 if 𝑐 ≻𝑠 𝜇(𝑠), then |𝜇(𝑐)| = 𝑞𝑐.  
In such priority-based allocation problems, the existence of a centralized matching 
mechanism is of course always assumed, as some procedure is required for allocating 
student seats when schools are not agents capable of looking for matches themselves. For 
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the same reason, stability, a central issue for college admissions problems, has no 
meaning in school choice and student placement problems. However, stability is closely 
related to the concept of fairness, which says that if student s prefers the allocation c of 
another student s', then s has a lower priority than s' for the school seat c allocated to s': 
for all students 𝑠, 𝑠′ ∊ 𝑆, 
 if 𝜇(𝑠′) ≻𝑠 𝜇(𝑠), then 𝑠
′𝜋𝑐𝑠.  
Balinski and Sömnez (1999) show that an allocation in a school choice or student 
admissions problem is individually rational, non-wasteful and if and only if the 
corresponding matching is stable for the corresponding college admissions problem. 
In addition to the above discussed incentive concerns, the welfare of an allocation is not 
evaluated the same way under the models. In the college admissions problem, considering 
the welfare of agents on both sides of the market is central. In the student placement and 
school choice problems, only the welfare of the students is considered, as schools are not 
seen as agents, but only as collections of objects to be consumed. This somewhat 
simplifies welfare analysis. The question then naturally raises of how good mechanisms 
should we hope to discover. Theorems 2 and 3 show that we cannot expect to find 
strategy-proof mechanisms for the college admissions model, and that for colleges, 
stability does not imply even weak Pareto efficiency. However, in the student admissions 
and school choice models, we assume away such complications. Unfortunately, we still 
have the following result: 
Theorem 7 (Kesten, 2010). No mechanism that is efficient and strategy-proof with 
respect to students’ preferences is stable. 
So no mechanism achieves everything. If we insist on the mechanism being strategy-
proof, even only for students, and also stable, we cannot expect it to be efficient in general. 
3.3   Mechanisms 
This section presents the algorithms that feature the most prominently in the matching 
market theory and surveys how these algorithms relate to each other and the results 
discussed above. We also briefly refer to related mechanisms that are not as important in 
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the context of college admissions, but nonetheless merit mention. Discussing the 
properties of the mechanisms is a good introduction to the practical relevance of the above 
results, and also to the issues that concern the design of admissions procedures in a more 
extensive sense. 
As is customary for illustrative purposes, we describe the algorithms as if students really 
went from door to door when applying for different colleges (as would be the case with a 
decentralized admissions procedure – note that the algorithms could be seen to be simple 
models of decentralized matching markets), though in real clearinghouses, applicants and 
colleges only need to report a list of preferences, which a computer then uses to work 
through the algorithm to produce a matching. 
3.3.1   Deferred acceptance mechanism  
The most famous mechanism is the widely applied student-proposing deferred acceptance 
(sDA) algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962), often also called the Gale-Shapley 
mechanism, which proceeds as follows: 
Round 1. Every student applies to her most preferred college. Every college tentatively 
accepts from its applicants its most preferred students up to its capacity qc and rejects the 
rest, if the number of applicants exceeds its capacity. If the number of students who regard 
the college as their first preference is less than the capacity of the college, the college 
tentatively accepts all applicants. 
Generally, in  
Round k. Every student rejected in round 𝑘 − 1 applies to the college she prefers to the 
rest among those colleges that have not yet rejected her. Every college tentatively accepts 
from its applicants (pooling both those that applied in this round and those that were 
tentatively accepted in the previous rounds) its most preferred students up to its capacity 
qc and rejects the rest, if the number of applicants exceeds its capacity. If the number of 
students who regard the college as their first preference is less than the capacity of the 
college, the college tentatively accepts all applicants.  
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The algorithm terminates after any round k in which no applicants are rejected, or students 
still left without a place in college have proposed to all colleges they find acceptable. At 
that point, the tentative acceptances of round k turn into final acceptances, and the match 
is fixed.  
It is noteworthy that during the algorithm, no students propose to the same college twice. 
That would be pointless, because if a student is rejected by a college during stage k, she 
will certainly be rejected at any later stage 𝑘 + 𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ ℕ, as the college can only hold a 
more preferred set of students at a later stage.  
The college-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is analogous to the student-
proposing variant, but it has colleges propose to students and students tentatively accept 
college seats until no college place is rejected, or colleges with spare capacity left have 
proposed to all students they consider acceptable. The serial dictatorship mechanism (SD) 
equals the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm which equals the college-
proposing deferred acceptance algorithm when all colleges have the same preferences 
over students (Fack, Grenet & He, 2019). In it, the highest ranked student picks a seat at 
her favorite college, and generally, the kth ranked student picks a seat at her favorite 
college among those with unfilled seats left. Balinski and Sömnez (1999) also show that 
the multi-category serial dictatorship mechanism used to allocate students to colleges in 
Turkey always produces the same matching as the college-proposing deferred acceptance 
algorithm. 
The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm implements the student-optimal 
stable allocation alluded to in theorem 2, and likewise the college-proposing deferred 
acceptance algorithm implements the college-optimal stable matching (Gale and Shapley, 
1962; Roth, 1985). Therefore, the deferred acceptance mechanism is stable (i.e. fair with 
respect to the students’ preferences), and by theorem 3, we know that the student-
proposing variant is strategy-proof for students, though not for colleges (as is none other 
stable mechanism). However, as implied by theorem 2, the student-proposing deferred 
acceptance algorithm is not efficient with respect to preferences of students in the set of 
all matchings (only weakly so), and the college-proposing version is not even weakly 
efficient for colleges in the set of all matchings. Ergin (2002) characterizes an acyclity 
restriction that is needed on preferences (priorities) of colleges to guarantee that the 
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student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm produces a Pareto efficient outcome for 
students.  
The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is also not immune to manipulation 
via capacities (Kesten, 2012) but it is in certain sense less manipulable via capacities than 
any other stable mechanism (Ehlers, 2010). Though both are manipulable via pre-
arranged matches, the student-proposing variant less so than the college-proposing one 
(Afacan, 2013). Kojima (2007) presents the minimal restrictions on college preferences 
to ensure the non-manipulability via pre-arranged matches and capacities and notes that 
they are unlikely to hold in applications. Roth (2008b) discusses the properties and 
applications of deferred acceptance algorithms in length and Kojima and Manea (2010) 
provide an axiomatization of the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, i.e. 
the conditions on a matching mechanism which make it the sDA. 
3.3.2   Top trading cycles mechanism  
The top trading cycles mechanism (TTC) of Shapley and Scarf (1974) is another 
theoretically prominent mechanism, though not in very wide use in college and school 
choice situations and is usually presented in as a mechanism for priority-based allocation 
problems rather than two-sided matching markets. It can be seen to let students to trade 
their priorities at different colleges to gain mutually better matches for the students. It 
proceeds as follows: 
Round 1. Every student points to her most preferred college and every college points to 
its most preferred student. A cycle is an ordered list of students and colleges 
(𝑠1, 𝑐1, 𝑠2, 𝑐2, … , 𝑠𝑘, 𝑐𝑘), where s1 points to c1, c1 points to s2, s2 points to c2 and so on, 
until finally ck points to s1 and a cycle forms. Because of finiteness of the sets of students 
and colleges, at least one cycle will always form, and no student can partake in more than 
one cycle and no college can be in more than one cycle in one round (Abdulkadiroğlu & 
Sönmez, 2003). Students in a cycle get a seat in the college which they point at and are 
removed. 
Generally, in 
40 
  
Round k. Every student still without a seat point at her favorite college among those with 
unfilled seats left, and every college with unfilled seats points to its most preferred student 
among the remaining students. At least one cycle will form, students in a cycle get a seat 
in the college that they point at and are removed. 
The algorithm terminates when all students are assigned a seat, or all colleges are at full 
capacity or the remaining students do not find any of the colleges with capacity left 
acceptable, or none of the colleges with capacity left find any of the remaining students 
acceptable. The top trading cycles mechanism is efficient with respect to the students’ 
preferences and strategy-proof for students, but unstable (Abdulkadiroğlu & Sönmez, 
2003), showcasing theorems 2 and 7: a mechanism that produces a matching that students 
(weakly) prefer to the student optimal stable matching cannot be stable. There is a 
fundamental conflict between stability and Pareto efficiency. In the vocabulary of the 
school choice problem, the top trading cycles mechanism is unfair.  
Kesten (2006) strengthens the notion of acyclicality introduced by Ergin (2002) to 
provide a restriction on college preferences under which the student-proposing deferred 
acceptance and the top trading cycles algorithms are equivalent, meaning that sDA is 
efficient and TTC is stable. However, as is the case for the acyclicality condition of Ergin 
and the conditions Kojima (2007) finds for sDA, the social planner might not want to 
restrict the preference formation of colleges in such a way for other reasons, nor are the 
conditions likely to hold in applications if not enforced. 
Strikingly, the top trading cycles mechanism is also immune to manipulation via 
capacities (Kesten, 2012), highlighting the counter-intuitive conflict between stability and 
non-manipulability via capacities stated in theorem 5. 
3.3.3   Boston mechanism  
The so-called Boston mechanism, presented in Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) and 
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005) and of which many variants have been used in various school 
districts in the United States, is closely related to the student-proposing deferred 
acceptance algorithm, but in it the acceptances are final in every round (therefore 
sometimes called an immediate acceptance algorithm). It proceeds in the following way: 
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Round 1. Every student applies to her most preferred college. Every college accepts from 
its applicants its most preferred students up to its capacity qc and rejects the rest, if the 
number of applicants exceeds its capacity. If the number of students who regard the 
college as their first preference is less than the capacity of the college, the college accepts 
all applicants. 
Round 2.  Every student rejected in the first round apply to her second most preferred 
college. Every college with capacity left accepts from its applicants its most preferred 
students up to its capacity qc and rejects the rest, if the number of applicants exceeds its 
remaining capacity. If the number of students who regard the college as their second 
preference is less than the remaining capacity of the college, the college accepts all 
applicants. 
Generally, in  
Round k. Every student rejected in round 𝑘 − 1 applies to her kth most preferred college. 
Every college with capacity left accepts from its applicants its most preferred students up 
to its capacity qc and rejects the rest, if the number of applicants exceeds its remaining 
capacity. If the number of students who regard the college as their second preference is 
less than the remaining capacity of the college, the college accepts all applicants. 
The algorithm concludes after any round k in which there are no rejections, or the students 
still left without a place in college have no colleges they consider acceptable left to apply 
to. After the first round, all students who get admitted to their first preference are ensured 
a seat in it, and popular schools are therefore likely to be full (with final matches) already 
after the first round. The Boston mechanism can therefore be seen as prioritizing first 
preferences, and like TTC, it is efficient with respect to the students’ preferences 
(Abdulkadiroğlu & Sönmez, 2003). Concerning strategic behavior by colleges, it makes 
reporting their true preferences a dominant strategy for colleges (Ergin & Sömnez, 2006) 
and is immune to manipulation via capacities (Kesten, 2012).  
However, the Boston mechanism suffers from a major drawback: it is neither strategy-
proof for students nor stable with respect to the stated preferences (Abdulkadiroğlu & 
Sönmez, 2003), though the meaningfulness of the concept of stability (with respect to the 
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stated preferences) decreases as the extent of report manipulation increases. Similarly, 
the efficiency is with respect to the reported preferences, not the unknown actual 
preferences, and with serious misreporting of preferences present, the outcome is unlikely 
to be efficient with the respect to the true preferences.  
The manipulability of the Boston mechanism is easy to see from the description of the 
procedure. As the more popular colleges are likely to fill their seats during the first one 
or two rounds, a student who does not get into his first choice may have to settle for a 
much less preferred college. Because of this, the Boston mechanism induces a preference 
revelation game where a student must trade his preferences against the probability of 
getting admitted to various colleges, when compiling a list of reported preferences to 
maximize his expected utility.  
Simply stating the true preferences are unlikely to maximize expected utility, as Pathak 
and Sömnez (2008) show: a game induced by Boston mechanism with both sincere and 
sophisticated (who select their reports as best responses to the reports of the others) 
students present has as its Nash equilibrium outcomes the set of stable matchings of an 
otherwise similar economy, but where the sincere students relinquish their priorities to 
the sophisticated students. Moreover, every sophisticated player weakly prefers his 
assignment under the game induced by the Boston mechanism to the outcome of the 
student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (which is the student-optimal stable 
matching). In the case where all students are sophisticated, the set of Nash equilibrium 
matchings of the Boston game equals the set of stable matchings of the economy (Ergin 
& Sömnez, 2006; Kojima, 2008), and then the student-proposing deferred acceptance 
mechanism is clearly superior to the Boston mechanism from the viewpoint of the 
students.  
Of course, these are game theoretic results that rely on the ability of the sophisticated 
players to coordinate their actions so as to bring about their preferred equilibrium 
outcome, which comes about naturally in the perfect information setting of a theoretical 
game but are not so likely in the less than perfect informational environment of real 
admissions procedures. The concern of spurious efficiency highlights the possibly 
paramount importance of strategy-proofness, but the fact that a mechanism is not strategy-
proof does not have to mean that the expected gains from misreporting would be large, 
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nor that there would be empirically significant misreporting in applications. Indeed, Roth 
and Rothblum (1999) show that in a low information environment, students’ payoffs from 
misreporting are low for the college-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, even 
though it is not strategy-proof for them.  
However, Chen and Sömnez (2006) provide evidence that compared to the top trading 
cycles and student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanisms, the Boston mechanism is 
more likely to be manipulated in an experimental setting, and consequently less efficient 
with respect to the true preferences. Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2006) also describe some 
empirical patterns suggesting differing level of sophistication among the applicants to 
Boston Public Schools, and the fact that there were parents’ groups dedicated to 
discussing optimal reporting strategies is in itself indicative of strategic behavior (Pathak 
and Sömnez (2008) note that at least one parents’ group opposed abandoning the Boston 
mechanism).  
3.3.4   Strategic behavior in strategy-proof environments and fragility of strategy-
proofness 
Above we discussed the issues that arise with mechanisms that are not strategy-proof and 
consequently force students to act strategically. Because we do not directly observe the 
true preferences, it is not straightforward to assess the extent to which a mechanism is 
manipulated. Consequently, it is tempting to conclude that participants have a good 
understanding of the mechanisms and act to maximize their expected payoffs in terms of 
the matches. However, numerous experimental studies document that a significant 
proportion of applicants misreport their preferences even under strategy-proof 
mechanisms (e.g. Chen & Sönmez, 2006; Featherstone & Niederle, 2016; Klijn, Pais & 
Vorsatz, 2013). 
More worryingly, recent empirical evidence points to the same direction (Hassidim, 
Marciano, Romm & Shorrer, 2017). Hassidim, Romm and Shorrer (2016) study a college 
admissions procedure where applicants are asked to indicate their preferences over 
alternatives that admit a natural ranking, i.e. the same study track with and without a 
funding and find that a significant fraction of applicants try to manipulate the student-
reporting deferred acceptance algorithm. Shorrer and Sóvágó (2017) report similar results 
in a similar matching-with-contracts setting in Hungarian college admissions. Rees-Jones 
44 
  
(2018) combines reported preferences with survey responses and finds misreporting in 
the American residency program for new physicians.  
These studies indicate that such mistaken misreporting is more common for those with 
lower cognitive abilities and those applying to more competitive programs. Not 
surprisingly, mistakes seem more common when the stakes are lower. Such findings 
indicate a significant failure to act rationally (at least with respect to any standard 
preferences) and raise concerns about resulting effects on equity in admissions.  
Hassidim et al. (2017) identify several reasons for mistaken misreporting. If it is not 
specified clearly in the instructions, the applicants may fail to understand that the 
mechanism is strategy-proof. Moreover, even if the instructions advice the applicants to 
submit their true preferences (preferably with an explanation of the algorithm), the 
applicants may not trust the advice and also fail to identify truth-telling as the dominant 
strategy themselves. The applicants may even believe that although the mechanism 
presented is strategy-proof, the policy maker will not actually utilize it in matchmaking. 
Another reason is that the applicants may not bother to list the choices they are sure they 
will not get admitted into, which is very evident in admissions procedures that employ 
entrance examinations: a student will have a probability of zero to get to study any subject 
she does not take an examination in, so there is nothing to gain from listing such choices 
(but possibly a psychological cost to pay, if the participant cares not only about her 
assignment – see Köszegi (2006) for a behavioral model).  
Finally, Hassidim et al. (2017) note that applicants may have social preferences, which 
may explain why some students rank funded positions lower than unfunded positions, if 
they see others as more deserving of the financial help. However, such preferences do not 
seem likely to affect the choice of college, or other similar personally very significant 
assignment. As another type of social preferences, Aygün and Turhan (2017) describe a 
case where there is a stigma attached to funded positions, explaining why many applicants 
prefer regular unfunded positions to the funded ones. 
Again, empirical results have spurred new theoretical research. Ashlagi and 
Gonczarowski (2018) utilize a property of mechanisms called obvious strategy-proofness, 
defined by Li (2017a) in a more general mechanism design setting, and show that no 
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stable mechanism is obviously strategy-proof for students. Ashlagi and Gonczarowski 
conclude that there may not be any alternative way to describe the deferred acceptance 
mechanism in such a way that makes its strategy-proofness more obvious to participants. 
They note that the social planner must then try to ensure truthful participation by gaining 
the trust of the applicants so that they both trust its advice and do not suspect the designer 
of deviating from the announced mechanism. 
The literature also shows that strategy-proofness is also fragile in a theoretical sense. 
Haeringer and Klijn (2009) show that otherwise strategy-proof mechanisms are 
manipulable if applicants can report their preferences over only a fixed number 𝑘 < |𝐶| 
of colleges, i.e. the length of the list of reported preferences is constrained, as is very 
common in applications. Calsamiglia, Haeringer and Klijn (2010) study such constraints 
in an experimental setting and find largely the results that Haeringer and Klijn 
theoretically predict: truth-telling is reduced, and consequently also stability and 
efficiency (with respect to true applicant preferences).  
Fack, Grenet and He (2019) study more general application costs where applicants face 
a constant marginal cost per college reported after the first K choices (nesting the model 
of Haeringer and Klijn) and similarly show that the student-proposing deferred 
acceptance algorithm ceases to be strategy-proof. Pathak and Sömnez (2013) provide an 
approach for comparing the manipulability of mechanisms and show that the 
manipulability of the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm decreases with the 
constraint k on the report length and that it is less manipulable than the Boston mechanism 
with the same constraint k. 
3.3.5   Large market results 
Kojima and Pathak (2009) prove that as the market grows large (under certain loose 
regularity conditions and the requirement that students only rank a small proportion of 
colleges), the proportion of colleges that can benefit from misstating their preferences in 
the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism tends to zero. Moreover, also 
colleges’ incentives to manipulate the sDA via capacities and pre-arranged matches 
vanishes in a large market. The intuition is that the proportion of colleges that are matched 
to the same set of students in all stable matchings tends to one as the market grows. By 
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contrast they show that the incentives of students to manipulate the Boston mechanism 
remain large as the market size grows, demonstrating that the advantage that the sDA has 
over the Boston mechanism with regards to students’ incentives is robust to large market 
sizes, while the advantages that the Boston mechanism has regarding the incentives of 
colleges vanishes in large markets.  
Moreover, Lee (2018) shows under weaker assumptions that the proportion of colleges 
with significant incentives to manipulate the student-proposing deferred acceptance 
mechanism vanish in large markets. Azevedo and Budish (2019) also study strategy-
proofness in large markets and introduce the property of strategy-proofness in the large, 
which they show to hold for strategy-proof mechanisms but not for the Boston 
mechanism. They also try to assess the size of the market required for strategy-proofness 
in the large to hold. 
Azevedo and Leshno (2016) develop a supply and demand framework for two-sided 
matching markets, which can be used to analyze the asymptotics of matching 
mechanisms. In their model, only the number of students grows large, i.e. a continuum of 
students is matched to a constant number of colleges, which may be more realistic than 
assuming that the number of colleges grows without bound. Stable matchings are 
characterized by college cutoffs, which determine the set of students matched to a given 
college. Azevedo and Leshno find that the set of stable matchings converges to the unique 
stable matching of the continuum model when the number of students grows. Che, Kim 
and Kojima (2019) use a similar setting to show that a stable matching does exist with a 
continuum of students even when colleges’ preferences over students exhibit 
complementarities.  
Ashlagi, Kanoria and Leshno (2017) show that even with a slight difference in the number 
of college seats and the number of students, the number of stable matchings will be very 
small. This holds regardless of market size, provided that colleges have responsive 
preferences and are small relative to the market. This may explain why the set of stable 
matchings with respect to reported preferences is often small in applications (Roth, 
2015b), and together with theorem 4 of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1987), indicates 
little room for beneficial strategic behavior in such environments. 
47 
  
While there is little work towards showing how large the market must be for the 
asymptotic results to be a good approximation, these results may help to explain the 
empirical observation that the sDA tends to work quite well in large markets (Roth, 2002, 
2018), at least in the sense of not being prone to unraveling. This even though its incentive 
properties are not theoretically faultless, as shown by Roth (1982) and Dubins and 
Freedman (1981). 
3.4   Empirical analysis of matching markets 
Recently, a lot of work of has gone into econometric analysis of matching situations 
(Chiappori & Salanié, 2016). In the school and college choice settings, such empirical 
work has mostly focused on estimating preferences for analyzing the welfare gains from 
different mechanisms, often under the assumption of truth-telling under the student-
proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, as in Abdulkadiroğlu, Agarwal and Pathak 
(2017) and Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009). Agarwal and Somaini (2018) and Fack et al. 
(2019) take the possibility of strategic behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms seriously 
and assess alternative assumptions for identifying preferences, including a weaker version 
of truth-telling, stability of the matching and that participants use only undominated 
strategies.  
However, Fack et al. (2019) find that though the assumption of stability seems to work 
the best in their context of high school choice in one Parisian district, the estimated 
models do not perform particularly well in predicting the observed assignments. This is 
likely to reflect both insufficient covariates and weak information contained in reported 
preferences, highlighting once again that policy analysis based on untruthful or 
incomplete preference information is liable to be misguided. 
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4   DESIGNING A COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROCEDURE 
This section discusses the aims of a college admissions procedure, what a market design 
approach to college admissions entails and the empirical and normative questions which 
the policy maker must confront when designing such a procedure. We also briefly discuss 
the theoretical work that aims to understand the functioning of decentralized college 
admissions markets relative to the properties of centralized clearinghouses discussed in 
the previous chapter.  
4.1   The aims of a college admissions procedure 
As is evident with the recent reforms in Finland, policy makers may have multiple 
aspirations for a mechanism such as a college admissions procedure. The reform was 
initially announced with the aim of speeding up the transition of new high school 
graduated to higher education (VNK, 2015), and as discussed above in the context of 
entrance examinations, universities also report to regard many aspects of the admissions 
procedure important: sorting the applicants based on their motivation, abilities, and 
suitability, and informing the applicants about the subject they are applying to study. It is 
also hoped that more motivated students graduate faster, and if the admissions procedure 
succeeds in choosing the most motivated applicants, it also helps in achieving faster 
transitions from higher education to working life (Ahola et al, 2018), another goal sought 
by policy makers (e.g. VNK, 2015). Students who get to specialize on the subjects they 
are interested would also seem to be more likely to make better workers, which will then 
result in better economic performance for the whole economy and higher tax income for 
the state.  
Besides of these concerns for financing of the public sector that tend to drive the 
ambitions for reform, satisfying the preferences of the applicants to the highest extent 
possible would also seem to be a worthy goal for itself, for many normative benchmarks 
from utilitarianism to the objective list or capabilities approaches of Rawls (1971, 2001), 
Sen (2009) and Nussbaum (2011) and also to perfectionistic ideals. Of course, the better 
economic performance that might follow from more motivated students also brings more 
general utilitarian gains in addition to the gains accruing to the applicants through 
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preference satisfaction, and likewise contribute to the primary goods allocation of the 
worst off in the Rawlsian case.  
Whether the preferences of colleges should be given any concern is another topic. As 
discussed above in the context of entrance examinations, some see the autonomy of 
colleges as a fundamental design objective, which naturally would leads one to consider 
satisfying their preferences as important (in the extreme, even as a reason to abolish all 
legal requirements to partake in the centralized matching mechanism). However, it is also 
possible to view the preferences of colleges as instrumentally important: insofar as the 
preferences of colleges concern ability and suitability for the profession, satisfying them 
as far as possible is again instrumental for achieving better overall economic outcomes. 
Although these goals may seem diverse, they broadly concern the compatibility between 
students and colleges: if preferences of students are as well matched with the preferences 
of the colleges (suitability for studies, abilities) as possible, good outcomes will follow. 
Pekkarinen and Sarvimäki (2016) list four criterions on what defines a good college 
admissions system:  
1. The preferences of applicants and colleges are satisfied as well as possible given 
the preferences of all,  
2. Factors deemed irrelevant, such as family background, gender and place of 
residency do not yield advantages or disadvantages to applicants, 
3. Applicants are not unreasonably penalized for past mistakes, 
4. The procedure of student assignment does not waste resources, for example, in 
the form of requiring substantial time and financial investments from applicants 
and schools. 
Of these, numbers 1 and 2 concern the compatibility of students and colleges, where the 
second criterion assures that factors that have no bearing on innate capabilities of 
applicants do not influence allocations. At the same time, the second criterion also 
articulates the usual requirement of equality of opportunity. The second criterion can also 
be seen as disallowing situations of justified envy (i.e. instability), where somebody with 
higher scores loses a seat she would like more to somebody with lower scores. In any 
case, requiring no justified envy is a requirement the public is likely to see important.  
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The third criterion presents a normative constraint on the mechanism: applicants who did 
not do well in studies in their early life should still have a possibility to get admitted to 
higher education later in life, though not necessarily as good chance as the average new 
high school graduate. The fourth criterion states a somewhat loose efficiency 
requirement. It is noteworthy that it conflicts with the first criterion if more expensive 
admissions procedures help to increase the compatibility between students and colleges, 
and must then be understood to require that more expensive procedures are only 
acceptable up to the point where costs equal, in some sense, the value of improved 
aggregate matchings. The fourth criterion could also be seen to require strategy-proofness 
because of mental and financial costs related to determining optimal strategy. Pathak 
(2017) notes how strategy-proofness is in the context of real school choice mechanisms 
the design objective that the public seems to find the most important, while the theoretical 
literature has seen it purely as an incentive constraint for achieving the consequentialist 
objective of satisfying the preferences of students over schools.  
Keeping the proportions of men and women in higher education relatively stable and 
equal is often emphasized as one design objective, especially in context of policy changes. 
In 2017, approximately 53% of students in higher education were women (Official 
Statistics of Finland, 2018b). Abandoning the entrance examinations has been feared by 
some to lead to a significant reduction in the number of men admitted, as men are often 
believed to do worse in high school (Ahola et al, 2018). However, Karhu (2018) disputes 
the claim that men do worse: while women complete more subjects in the matriculation 
examinations and do a bit better in most, they tend to do worse in advanced mathematics, 
which gets a significant weighting in admittance to many competitive college programs 
currently (e.g. in the case of business schools, Hyvönen, 2019). In general, the differences 
are not large.  
Ahola et al. (2018) note that men did a bit better in the system based on entrance 
examinations in 2016: the proportion of admitted to applicants was higher for men than 
women (in terms of admittance to the stated first preference), but the differences vary 
from sector to sector. Taking the most demanded sectors as an example, also because 
stating a first preference for one of them is more likely to be truthful, women did worse 
in medicine but were more likely to get admitted to study law, while in business studies 
there was very little difference.  
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Hyvönen (2019) finds that the proportion of women in those admitted relative to the 
proportion of women in applicants has increased marginally (by around 5%) in business 
schools since 2015, concurrently with the changes that have increased the role of 
matriculation examination grades and high school curriculum in admittance. More 
strikingly, when medical schools unified their admissions procedures in 2018 so that the 
same entrance examination is valid for all of them (i.e. effectively allowing application 
to multiple medical schools at the same time) the proportion of women in the set of 
admitted students increased from around 55% to 65%, more closely now reflecting the 
proportion of women in applicants, which was 64% (Seppänen, 2019). Whether these 
findings correspond to causal relations is dubious, though the change in medical school 
students’ gender distribution is large enough to make it quite believable.  
In any case, it is not clear how such concerns fit into the criterions of Pekkarinen and 
Sarvimäki (2016) above. Requiring equality of opportunity as in the second criterion does 
not prohibit women from being a larger proportion of college students, if they on average 
score higher than men on the admittance criteria deemed optimal for ranking applicants 
on the basis of the capabilities required for the subject. On the contrary, it would seem 
that selecting admittance criteria to ensure that men and women do equally well on 
average would discriminate against women, if such criteria were not deemed optimal for 
sorting the applicants based on required capabilities. On the other hand, if it was not 
possible to very exactly define the capabilities required for the studies (say, in terms of 
performance in the matriculation examinations), then it would be difficult to speak of 
discrimination to one direction or another.  
Of course, it is also possible to include an additional criterion that conflicts with the 
requirement of equality of opportunity. Establishing quotas for men and women in 
programs where the gender distribution is thought to be too biased (and similarly for other 
groups deemed to be underrepresented) was recommended in one earlier memorandum 
of the Ministry of Education and Culture (OKM, 2012a), though the writers were unable 
to admit that this would deteriorate the equality of opportunity and the proposition was 
ultimately not implemented. The rationale in OKM (2012a) was that the biased gender 
distribution in many professions (teachers in comprehensive schools, for example) 
imposes severe costs on the society, in part because of role models presented to children 
and adolescents. It is difficult to assess if such claims have merit. As OKM (2016) remind, 
52 
  
the gender distribution in higher education reflects decisions made earlier in life: in 2017, 
women constituted 58% of both high school students and new graduates (Official 
Statistics of Finland, 2018a). 
4.2   Preferences and welfare 
The demand for education stems from the preferences of the applicants. Preferences 
concerning such an important good as education are a complicated matter. It is not only 
about what the person prefers to study for the next few years, as education determines 
much of what the person is going to do over her life and has a large effect on her expected 
lifetime income. Financially, higher education is a good investment in Finland: 
Koerselman and Uusitalo (2014) report that taking into account taxes and transfers, 
someone with a college degree can expect to have disposable income of around 60-70% 
higher than those with only vocational education, though the expected income differs 
widely between subjects. Of course, there are other potential reasons to attend college, 
such as interest in the subject of choice, an experience of higher social standing and so 
on.  
4.2.1   Preference formation, truthful reporting and welfare analysis 
The way how economists usually abstract away details of emotions and desires when 
considering choices, preferences and welfare is criticized by Nussbaum (2016), among 
others. Matching models include simple ordinal preference relations of the above form as 
a representation of the mental entities that explain choices and reveal the individual’s 
evaluations of her welfare. These preference relations are taken as exogenously 
determined, and what they entail is not usually discussed very seriously. As discussed 
above, the preference relations are also usually taken to include all relevant aspects of the 
situation, in this case including for students all things that could affect preference for a 
college over another. This rules out discussions of preference formation: how colleges 
formulate their preferences over students and what the preferences of students comprise.  
The college admissions problem is also static. In real college admission procedures, the 
applicants arrive sequentially in lumps, but as the time between consecutive admissions 
procedures is relatively long and the flow of applicants is not continuous, it seems a 
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reasonable simplification to design clearing houses based on static models5. However, as 
there are no more periods than one, questions concerning optimal application and 
admission strategies over time and evolving preferences do not appear. 
Quite simply, in these models student s preferring college C1 to college C2 means that 
given a free choice between them, she chooses C1, and s never chooses C2 when C1 is 
available (Roth & Sotomayor, 1990: pp. 17-18). We would believe that real preference 
relations depend on a variety of factors, in that a preference for C1 over C2 means that C1 
scores sufficiently much higher than C2 in the set of the characteristics deemed important 
by the applicant (given her information on the characteristics): her intrinsic interest in the 
subject, demand for labor with the given degree and the geographical dispersion of the 
demand, the expected income for a person with the degree, the difficulty level of the 
studies, the difficulty of getting admitted, distance from her hometown, whether or not 
her friends attend college in the same location, and so on.  
In other words, the preferences are not purely over the alternative studies, and moreover, 
the choices that we observe may also include the effect of binding budget constraints and 
incomplete financial markets (financial constraints are not that large of an issue in 
Finland, because there are no tuition fees and studying is heavily subsidized, though as 
noted above, preparing for entrance examinations can be quite costly). Here we could 
then make the distinction between preferences over study subjects versus preferences over 
the alternative study paths as a whole, which are ultimately what determines choices and 
therefore all that we usually observe.  
Of course, it is possible to model preference relations instead of taking them as 
exogenously determined, allowing for dependence on factors like the abovementioned. 
However, endogenizing more factors to a model comes at the cost of complexity. 
Moreover, the objective in matching theory is not to analyze preference formation but to 
examine the matching market outcomes that given preferences yield.  
While simplifying assumptions are necessary for building a theory, these become 
important issues in practice, mainly because we would like to make welfare evaluations 
                                                 
5 There are some interesting recent work looking into designing mechanisms for dynamic markets, e.g. 
Baccara, Lee and Yariv (2018) and Doval (2019). 
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(or general normative evaluations) based on satisfaction of the stated preferences, as 
embodied in criterion 1 of Pekkarinen and Sarvimäki (2016), but also because we would 
like to use the theory as a guide for analyzing the stability and other aspects of real 
mechanisms. If mechanism φ is equal to another mechanism ψ in all other relevant aspects 
but always satisfies the stated preferences better, we would like to say that φ is better than 
ψ, or dominates it. But this requires assuming that the stated preferences are somehow a 
good measure of welfare. As noted above, the (constrained) preferences over study paths 
may be due to various factors. The question then arises of what the society sees as 
normatively relevant reasons behind choices. Exogenous preferences can also lead to 
situations where we may be falsely lead to believe a mechanism to be strategy-proof, 
when it actually is not, as might be in the case of colleges employing costly entrance 
examinations to determine preferences over students. 
It then becomes important to assess whether the application under consideration violates 
the modelling assumptions to an extent where the model is unlikely to contribute much 
to our understanding of the situation or yield reliable predictions. In real-life (centralized) 
college admissions procedures the applicants are asked to provide their preference 
relation, and for welfare evaluations and other applications of the model it must then be 
asked if  
1. Real-life preferences have the same structure as that defined for agents’ 
preferences in the model, 
2. The reported preferences equal the true preferences, 
3. The preferences over the alternatives in question are sufficient for making welfare 
assessments on different mechanisms. 
First of all, it is assumed that the students’ preference relations are rational, which just 
requires that the applicants can rank all their options in an internally consistent way. This 
is not a particularly strong assumption in the context of college choice, because the 
decisions concerning education are significant enough to require serious thought, which 
seems likely prevent violations of transitivity. Similarly, ruling out transfers between 
agents on the same side of the market is clearly appropriate.  
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The assumption that individuals only care about their own outcomes is clearly false to 
some extent, as students certainly care about if their friends get admitted to nearby 
colleges. This is generalization of the problem of allocating doctors to internships in the 
presence of couples: a mechanism that is strategy-proof for standard preferences can still 
allow for strategic behavior when student preferences exhibit such interdependencies 
(few mechanisms used either in theory or practice even allow reporting such preferences) 
and no mechanism is stable for such preferences (Roth, 1984). However, it would seem 
unlikely that this would reverse a large proportion of preference orderings on average, 
though it is ultimately an empirical question. Another question is whether the policy 
maker should consider such preferences “valid”: if student s prefers a business school to 
engineering studies if and only if his friend also gets admitted to the business school, 
should we think of it as a welfare loss when s gets stuck in the business school without 
his friend?  
This leads us to the more general issue of evolving preferences, where preferences before 
and after the matching has taken place differ. Of course, in reality matchings that appear 
at first stable can over time become unstable, as some students find out that they did not 
like the subject after all (information increases), circumstances in the labor market change 
and so on. There is also the curious possibility of truly unstable preferences, where 
preference relations reverse from time to time, grass always being greener on the other 
side of the fence (these are what Elster (1982) calls counteradaptive preferences). 
However, evolving and unstable preferences present a problem for welfare analysis, 
because if matchings that seem preference maximizing and stable ex ante become 
inefficient to a considerable extent after some time, it would seem dubious to make 
welfare assessments on the basis of ex ante preference satisfaction.  
Exogenous preferences also hide away what Sen (1977) calls commitment, which could 
lead to moral concerns influencing an agent to make application choices that do not 
correspond to what he believes would maximize his individual welfare. Then observed 
choices, which in the case of centralized college admissions are the reported preferences, 
need not be equal to the true preferences (or maybe we could say that the true preferences 
are altruistic, i.e. not corresponding to personal welfare maximization – in any case, the 
observed choices do not maximize personal welfare). Commitment would present issues, 
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if applicants regularly opted for choices they do not believe to maximize their own 
welfare because of concerns for other people, which might not be very likely.  
Relatedly, Elster (1982) highlights the case of adaptive preferences, where a person 
adapts to his circumstances, and his preferences then reflect his set of feasible choices 
and social expectations imposed by the people close to him. Adaptive preferences are 
likely to be a real phenomenon of significance, as social environment certainly affect 
preferences and choices, and young people in particular may be inclined to be influenced 
by their circumstances. As noted above, Laukkonen (2018) provides evidence of those 
from less educated households being less likely to apply to highly demanded colleges. 
While this is probably partly because of credit constraints, it may also be the result of 
young adults from less educated households being shaped to prefer less demanding 
subjects, because of, for example, lower self-esteem and less educated parents setting 
other aspirations for their children.  
Adaptive preferences raise difficult questions for normative evaluations of admissions 
procedures, for many normative benchmarks. Is maximizing adapted preferences welfare 
maximizing? Maybe college admissions procedures (among other mechanisms) should 
not consider welfare maximization at all, but, for example, justify prioritizing preference 
maximization as a requirement of respecting personal autonomy in decision making. Then 
we could say that it follows that people have a right to make mistakes in choosing their 
study paths, and mostly ignore the questions of what kinds of societal outcomes 
preference maximization may lead to. While this may be a tempting possibility (and the 
one usually adopted), it runs into problems in the case of adaptive preferences, as 
preferences corrupted by personal circumstances are hardly autonomous. Adaptive 
preferences may also lead to a serious misallocation of talent from the point of view of 
the society, which also confounds more general utilitarian objectives, and finally 
financing of the public sector.  
Hausman and McPherson (2009) argue that preference satisfaction can be taken as a basis 
of welfare evaluation when two conditions hold. First, if people are self-interested in their 
preferences over the alternatives in question, then we can use people’s preferences as 
evidence of what people believe will benefit them. Secondly, if in that particular choice 
situation individuals are good in judging what is beneficial for them, then we can use their 
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preferences as evidence concerning what in fact is welfare maximizing for them. This is 
what Hausman and McPherson call the evidential view of the connection between 
preferences and well-being: we do not need to equate preference satisfaction with welfare 
maximization, but we can take preferences as reliable evidence of well-being in the 
abovementioned circumstances. Clearly, adaptive preference may lead to failure of the 
second condition. 
Also, we would first need to know the true preferences, which brings us to the issue of 
strategy-proofness. If the reported preferences do not equal the true preferences, we 
cannot even know what the applicants really (ex-ante) preferred, and we cannot make 
reliable welfare evaluations based on the reported preferences even if the two conditions 
of Hausman and McPherson (2009) obtain. Of course, as demonstrated in the above 
discussion, vulnerability to strategic behavior has a central place in the literature, and it 
is one of the most important contributions the matching model framework has for 
practical applications. However, real-life individuals and mechanisms are more 
complicated than their stylized model counterparts, and consequently strategic behavior 
has more scope in real-life admissions procedures than a naive analysis based on the 
college admissions model would suggest. 
Another important issue is whether it is sufficient to consider preferences over colleges 
for evaluating applicants’ welfare. In the context of school choice, the common practical 
requirement of strategy-proofness (Pathak, 2017) has made it evident that applicants tend 
to have strong preferences over the procedure itself and the costs caused by it. Quite 
understandably, the applicants do not seem to wish to partake in “admission games”. For 
non-strategy-proof mechanisms, applicants need to spend time to determine the optimal 
application strategy (i.e. the preference list to state). Therefore, the simple matching 
models cannot take such costs into account, as they would require modelling preferences 
over broader outcomes, something closes to the social welfare maximization approach of 
mechanism design.  
4.2.2   Preferences and excess demand  
The structure of student preferences is what largely causes the costs of the admissions 
procedure. If student preferences aligned well with college capacities (i.e. if students 
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applied to different programs approximately in the proportion of the seats available in 
them), a much smaller proportion of the applicants would be left without a degree place 
and consequently, there would be no large costs related to the same applicants applying 
year after year. However, when some programs get far more applications than they have 
capacity to admit, and the applicants’ preferences stay fixed in that they obstinately apply 
again and again to the same programs, the costs discussed above begin to mount.  
This is a fundamental problem in the sense that no admissions mechanism that allows for 
a non-negligible chance of admittance to highly demanded programs for also others than 
first time applicants, as embodied above in criterion 3, can escape it. If admittance is 
determined on the basis of the matriculation examinations instead of entrance 
examinations, there may be reason to hope that the costs will be smaller, but they will 
remain substantial: the time not spent preparing for entrance examinations will be spent 
preparing for retakes of the matriculation examinations. If admittance was based on 
lottery, the applicants would spend years doing something else and waiting for that lucky 
draw. On the other hand, if the first-timer quota approached 100 percent, then admittance 
for others would be nearly impossible, and they would have to acquiesce with something 
else. However, this would amount to a breach of criterion 3. In principle, the policy maker 
could also assign students to colleges based on some centrally fixed priority criteria 
(success in past studies) without regard for student preferences, but this would breach 
criterion 1 (and produce very counterproductive incentives). 
Because information plays such a huge role in preference formation, and many college 
programs find it difficult to fill their seats while others can admit annually only 5% of 
their applicants, the policy maker might hope to influence applicant preferences to steer 
the demand from the heavily contested programs to those facing weaker demand. This 
could be done by providing more information on different career possibilities for high 
school students: McGarth et al. (2014) report that increasing the information available to 
students before they make their higher education decisions and student counselling for 
college students seem to increase attainment rates. There is some evidence that providing 
information to students about the benefits of future education may increase their 
propensity to study more, at least in some settings (e.g. Jensen 2010; Oreopoulus & Dunn, 
2013), but less on whether they can be influenced to choose specific career paths over 
others.  
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This is especially important given the high proportion of third year high school students 
still uncertain about their future education preferences (TAT, 2018). It can at least be 
hoped for that increasing information about different career paths, in conjunction with the 
widely varying difficulty levels of admissions to different programs, would help to 
channel demand to meet the (exogenously determined) supply conditions.  
4.3   Adjusting supply to meet demand: a solution? 
Instead of trying to adjust the demand side to meet the supply of higher education, the 
policy maker could solve the chronic excess demand faced by the higher education system 
by adjusting supply to meet the demand conditions, heavily increasing the supply of 
education in highly demanded fields, such as medicine, and correspondingly decreasing 
the number of degree places available in college programs that face lower demand. In 
practice, the government could implement this by its usual means of financial control. Of 
course, this would then make the question of an optimal admissions mechanism trivial, 
because degree places would not be contested.  
Normatively, this could be based on two alternative judgements. Firstly, if we give a 
strong priority to satisfying applicant preferences, then naturally the optimal admissions 
mechanism is the one that gives everyone their stated first preference (which is clearly 
strategy-proof). Secondly, if the society sets as the objective the maximization of a 
general measure of social welfare, then satisfying student preferences can still be given a 
practical priority, if we believe it to be a very effective instrument for achieving higher 
economic performance.  
Of course, this requires that the demand is reasonably constant from year to year, or 
changing at a reasonably constant rate, because adjusting supply to meet large demand 
fluctuations would be difficult in practice. However, maintaining the second argument 
would be very difficult also for other reasons.   
First, as the Finnish higher education system is largely publicly financed, this would at 
least initially put a heavy burden on the taxpayers, at a time when the growing government 
deficit is already seen as a large problem. This is amplified by the fact that education in 
some of the more demanded subjects, especially medicine, are seen to be comparatively 
expensive to provide in an adequate manner. Of course, it could be argued that the current 
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investment in education is less than optimal, and radically increasing the financing of 
higher education and degree places would lead to higher output growth and higher tax 
income to balance the budget via increased productivity in the long run. However, the 
optimal level of investment in higher education is a contentious topic, and the effects of 
increased spending on productivity would certainly depend on its allocation between 
different colleges and the amount spend per one student.  
Secondly and relatedly, societal preferences concerning the optimal mix and level of 
education and the consequent labor supply need not correspond to the one demanded by 
the applicants. While there could be overall welfare gains because of higher output and 
increased preference satisfaction, as applicants are provided higher education in the 
subjects they desire, the structure of education demanded need not be the one that 
maximizes output or any other measure of well-being: maximizing the preferences of the 
applicants might result in a country full of lawyers and doctors, but that might not be an 
overall outcome that anyone would prefer.  
Of course, demand would adjust in the long run at least to some extent to the new market 
conditions. For example, increases in medical school intake would lead to more 
physicians in the labor market and consequently lower wages for them, which would 
likely help to decrease the demand for medical education. However, the resulting 
allocation need still not be socially optimal. The same may apply to the allocation of 
education that would result from a completely decentralized higher education sector, i.e. 
one where colleges would be completely independent from the policy maker both 
financially and in decision making. 
Finally, as discussed in the previous section, the preferences of applicants need not be 
very definite or final. Preferences concerning different subjects can evolve over time as 
new information cumulates, and a new high school graduate is unlikely to have very good 
information on all the possible topics that could interest her. Somebody who regards 
medicine as her first choice might find out that seeing blood keeps making her feel 
nauseous. If switching between different programs was very easy because of high supply, 
it would lessen the incentives to persist in finishing a degree in a given subject, even 
though looking back later, the student could prefer to have finished the degree, despite of 
discomfort felt during the studies. McGarth et al. (2014) note that in some cases, open 
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access to higher education seems to be associated with lower graduation rates. Here there 
is a possible conflict between two aspects. On one hand, sometimes switching from one 
program to another might be for the best of both the student and the society, if the student 
is much more motivated and talented in the subject she changes to. On the other hand, 
because of the indefiniteness of preferences, switching from one college to another need 
not really be welfare improving.  
The first two of the above points would make also the first kind of normative justification 
problematic, if the society values also the educational preference maximization of future 
generations and the capability of the state to supply them education was reduced by 
weakened economic performance. Still, as discussed above in section 2, it is noteworthy 
that in many European countries, a degree place in college is guaranteed for all eligible 
applicants. Of course, this does not yet correspond to the proposal above, because the 
undergraduate programs then tend to be much more general in curriculum, with the 
selection for more specialized education happening during the studies.   
As discussed in section 2, the Finnish government aims to set the supply of education to 
the optimal level by considering sector-level labor demand and the targeted industrial 
structure, though it can questioned if it currently succeeds in picking the welfare-
maximizing supply mix or if the policy makers, for example, do not take applicant 
preferences adequately into account. Of course, planning the supply of education centrally 
places high information requirements on the central planner.  
4.4   Centralized versus decentralized college admissions 
A recent strand of literature has strived to analyze game theoretically the functioning of 
decentralized college admissions markets, largely inspired by the American system. Che 
and Koh (2016) note that though the matching literature has seen a lot of research towards 
understanding the properties of matching algorithms used in centralized markets, and 
though there are studies that help to understand why some decentralized markets do not 
work well (e.g. Roth and Xing, 1994, 1997), it is not very well understood why many 
matching markets remain decentralized, and how to assess the welfare properties of 
decentralized markets relative to centralized markets.  
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It is outside of the scope of this study to examine these models in great detail, and in any 
case, the literature is still small. However, we aim to briefly conclude the results that have 
been obtained concerning the efficiency of a centralized clearinghouse relative to a 
decentralized market. 
Che and Koh (2016) study a model of decentralized matching where two colleges with 
limited capacity compete for a mass of students, with colleges valuing two attributes in 
students: a score that both colleges value in the same way (e.g. a matriculation 
examination grade average) and a value that measures the college-specific capability of 
the student (think of entrance examinations and interviews), and they admit those 
applicants that are good enough on a weighted combination of those scores. However, 
while the colleges face no uncertainty concerning student abilities, they do not observe 
students’ preferences, and their enrollment uncertainty depends also on the admissions 
decision made by the other college. This creates a situation where colleges will 
strategically admit students that the other college does not, by placing an excessive weight 
on the college-specific attributes of students. Because colleges have incentives to alleviate 
enrollment uncertainty, the model has also potential to explain why U.S. colleges often 
have a policy of preferring students whose parents attended the college, and why the 
colleges have a preference for students who show early interest to the college by partaking 
in the early admissions procedure, as analyzed also by Avery and Levin (2010). 
Consequently, Che and Koh (2016) find that students who rank very highly on the 
common score can receive less admissions than those who rank worse on the common 
score. The resulting matching is both unstable and inefficient. In their model, a transition 
to a centralized matching conducted via the student-proposing deferred acceptance 
algorithm would bring about efficiency and stability but could make some colleges worse 
off than under the decentralized market structure.  
Chade, Lewis and Smith (2014) analyze a somewhat similar model of decentralized 
college admissions, but they add frictions to the market: students find applications costly, 
and face uncertainty regarding how colleges rank their applications. Students’ preferences 
are also homogenous in their model, and the application cost is the same for both colleges 
and all students. Unlike in the model of Che and Koh (2016), students then need to solve 
a portfolio choice problem, and colleges face no aggregate uncertainty but observe student 
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quality only as a noisy signal. Chade et al. find that in equilibrium, student-college sorting 
may fail, with worse students applying more aggressively to the better college and the 
weaker college applying higher requirements. However, they do not consider how 
centralization would work in their model. 
Hafalir et al. (2018) study a model where colleges rank students based on their success in 
entrance examinations. As in Chade et al. (2014), there are only two colleges and 
students’ preferences are homogenous. The cost a student pays for the entrance 
examination depends on the ability of the student. They compare equilibria of centralized 
college admissions, where students apply to all colleges, and decentralized college 
admissions, where each student applies to only one college. However, in both cases, the 
entrance examination is a common one, and colleges do not rank the same exam 
differently. It then can be seen to correspond to a matriculation examination but may still 
capture quite well the sorting that happens with decentralized entrance examinations, 
because colleges set their cutoff levels independently. 
The model predicts that lower ability students prefer decentralized admissions while 
higher ability students prefer centralized admissions, and that student-college sorting can 
fail in decentralized markets but not in the centralized system. Interestingly, students can 
prefer the decentralized system, because centralized college admissions can lead to a 
higher effort exerted in equilibrium. This is intuitive in the sense that in the centralized 
system with common examinations, a student must compete against the whole pool of 
other students, while in the decentralized case, a student needs to compete with only those 
that applied to that college. As Hafalir et al. (2018) note, a definite answer depends on 
the utility loss assigned to the cost of the examination and the possible other benefits 
obtained from the study process.  
Interestingly, Hafalir et al. (2018) run experiments to test the predictions of their model 
and find that many of the results agree with the model, for example, the decentralized 
system leads to less sorting by ability and more high-ability students are left unassigned. 
However, subjects exert higher effort than predicted, possibly reflecting high risk 
aversion, and actually exert more effort in the decentralized market. 
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Yenmez (2018) utilizes the matching-with-contracts framework of Hatfield and Milgrom 
(2005) to device a clearinghouse that utilizes the student-proposing deferred acceptance 
mechanism. The clearinghouse allows students to specify financial aid in their 
preferences, and they can commit to enroll, as in early admissions programs. He then 
derives the conditions on college preferences under which the sDA will implement a 
stable matching. Yenmez argues that such a centralized procedure would keep the 
desirable properties of decentralized college admissions, such as commitment (or 
signaling) and yield management, while avoiding unfairness and unraveling. 
It is important to note that market centralization is a multifaceted thing that can come in 
many forms. Centralization can be in the form of having a single, centralized 
clearinghouse as the marketplace. In Finland, college admissions are largely conducted 
through a centralized clearinghouse, whereas in some countries, colleges look actively 
for students and students for colleges, without there being any centralized mechanism to 
arrange matches on the basis of stated preferences. On the other hand, when there is such 
a centralized matchmaking mechanism, the question of centralization in decision making 
arises.  
If decision making is decentralized, as largely was in the Finnish college admissions 
previously, colleges can themselves choose their admissions criteria to select their 
preferred set of students from among those that apply. Around 750 American colleges 
also use a common application platform (Yenmez, 2018). The centralized marketplace is 
then merely an information device, which helps students to learn of the various colleges 
and makes the sending of multiple applications formally convenient, even if admittance 
can require costly investments in practice. It would seem likely that less well-established 
colleges would find it therefore beneficial, while more well-known colleges would find 
it harmful for their applicants to learn of other potential choices. However, insofar as the 
colleges are not required to homogenize their admissions criteria, it would seem that there 
is little incentive to stay out. 
In a more centralized market, also decision making is centralized in that the policy maker 
sets tight constraints on the admissions criteria. Of course, there are always some 
constraints specified in the law, and even in a very centralized system the policy maker 
may prefer to leave some autonomy for colleges to decide on their criteria.  
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Centralized marketplaces and centralized decision making can occur due to willful 
participation, as is the case for the American doctors’ residency match, or because the 
state enforces it, as is the case in the Turkish college admissions procedure. Willful 
participation requires that the participants cannot improve their outcomes by looking for 
matches outside of the system. Establishing a centralized system requires that even if the 
participants could benefit from arranging matches outside of the system themselves, the 
state has the ability and is willing to enforce participation. If the state cannot enforce 
participation despite of requiring it by law, ignoring the possibility of strategic behavior 
may lead to wrong conclusions. Roth and Shorrer (2018) consider a situation where the 
policy maker cannot or does not want to enforce participation in the centralized 
marketplace and analyze theoretically the conditions that the marketplace mechanism 
must satisfy for it to be safe for the participants to join the marketplace. 
There is so far very little empirical work looking into the welfare effects of centralization 
relative to decentralization. Machado and Szerman (2019) use time variation in the 
gradual introduction of a centralized clearinghouse in Brazilian college admissions and 
report that it increased the assortative matching of students and colleges, with more 
application across geographical areas. There the centralization included abandonment of 
college-specific entrance examinations in favor of a common examination. 
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5   CONCLUSIONS  
In this thesis, we discussed the characteristics and recent developments of the Finnish 
college admissions procedure, reviewed the relevant two-sided matching literature that 
concerns the design of a clearinghouse and finally considered the aspects that a policy 
maker must take into account when designing a procedure for college admissions, 
including a brief look at the literature on the functioning of a decentralized college 
admissions market. On this basis, we can make some conclusions. Regarding practical 
recommendations, it is of course clear that very little can be coherently said without fixing 
a social welfare function that specifies the values the policy maker puts to students’ 
preferences relative to colleges’ preferences (or the autonomy of universities), among 
other things. Policy makers would do well to clearly specify the objectives they pursue 
and the trade-offs that they are willing to accept. 
Both theoretical literature and empirical experience suggests that the student-proposing 
deferred acceptance algorithm is the best way to conduct the matchmaking in a centralized 
clearinghouse, when fairness of the outcomes with respect to the admissions criteria is 
valued highly and there is little reason to be concerned that colleges engage in strategic 
behavior. These considerations are likely to be satisfied in the Finnish context: it would 
probably be seen as unacceptable that an applicant with a higher score would lose a place 
to someone with a lower score, and with the control that the state exerts over colleges in 
both capacity and admissions decisions, it would seem unlikely that they could 
manipulate the mechanism to their advantage6. The results concerning the large market 
behavior of the mechanism lend support to this.  
The student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism is the mechanism that best 
satisfies students’ preferences subject to the requirement that the students’ priority 
rankings at schools are not violated. That it is strategy-proof for students is another 
important advantage of the mechanism: first, for ensuring that the said efficiency and 
fairness properties hold with respect to the actual preferences, secondly, because 
manipulable mechanisms may put applicants from certain backgrounds to a weaker 
                                                 
6 Though we conjecture that there is at least a theoretical possibility that colleges could set the weighting 
of matriculation exam grades in a way differing from their real preferences to gain a preferred set of 
students. 
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position, and thirdly, because applicants are likely to dislike mechanisms that force them 
to spend time on deciding their optimal strategy. Welfare of applicants is likely to depend 
also on the procedure of the mechanism, not only their assignment. 
Indeed, the Finnish clearinghouse uses the student-proposing deferred acceptance 
mechanism (OKM, 2016). However, strategy-proofness of a mechanism is fragile. As 
shown by Dur et al. (2018), a deferred acceptance algorithm mechanism where applicants 
are given extra points for listing a college higher on their reported preferences is not 
strategy-proof. Such a system is still in place in Finland for some colleges, at least for 
some medical schools (Lääketieteelliset.fi, 2018). Moreover, the procedure allows 
students to list only six choices in their reported preferences, which Haeringer and Klijn 
(2009) show to ruin strategy-proofness. Removing these peculiarities would help in 
making the mechanism strategy-proof, probably with little cost. First timer quotas 
currently used could be analyzed formally using models of dynamic matching, but such 
a review is out of scope here. It seems likely that such quotas increase the propensity to 
take gap years but decreases the proportion of students who drop out after they acquire a 
seat in a preferred college. 
Even larger problem for the strategy-proofness of a mechanism is the presence of college-
specific entrance examinations. College-specific entrance examinations force a student to 
face a portfolio choice problem on the different entrance examinations, meaning that 
preferences must be weighed against the probability of admittance, much like we saw 
with the Boston mechanism. As a result, a student may take entrance examinations in and 
report as preferred colleges she does not really prefer to others. It also leads to a situation 
where a college regards as acceptable only a very minor subset of all students (i.e. those 
we took the entrance examination). The issue of strategy-proofness is then not so much 
about whether a student has incentives to report her true preferences to the mechanism, 
but about whether she takes entrance examination for the college she prefers. The 
centralized clearinghouse serves then merely as an information device and convenient 
application platform. 
However, as is the case with college-specific entrance examinations, using a common 
entrance examination does still not make it a strongly dominant strategy to reveal true 
preferences (only weakly so), because students still do not gain anything by listing 
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choices they do not believe they have any chance of getting admitted to. This must be 
kept in mind when using the reported preferences for analyzing demand for different 
colleges and subjects. Very competitive colleges are likely to be even more strongly 
preferred than it seems like. Some writers analyze the proportion of students that have 
received their first reported preference as indicative of match quality (e.g. Ahola & Spoof, 
2019; OKM, 2016), but this is dubious with no knowledge of true preferences. 
Still, we conjecture that a system with a common entrance examination is more strategy-
proof, because then the student is not faced with a portfolio choice problem regarding the 
set of different entrance examinations7,  and the possibility of admittance is then never 
quite zero, as it is with colleges for which one does not take an entrance examination. The 
central distinction seems to be whether the application cost is common or college specific. 
The theory of two-sided matching cannot yet say much about such issues, though there is 
some recent work that extends the college admissions model to a case of common 
entrance examinations (e.g. Abizada & Chen, 2015; Perach & Rothblum, 2010). 
Applicants may try to manipulate even a strategy-proof mechanism, which makes it clear 
that they should be presented with clear information on the procedure, and that the policy 
maker must try to retain the trust of the general public. 
However, there are several thorny questions which the policy maker cannot escape. It is 
evident that no mechanism design solution can by itself solve the problem of excess 
demand for certain colleges and shortage of demand for others, and the consequent long 
waiting times for access to higher education. If preferences of applicants differ from the 
supply of education deemed optimal by the policy maker, potentially also in the sense 
that there are more applicants than the policy maker considers it optimal to give access to 
higher education to, there will be mismatch between demand and supply and long waiting 
lists as a result. Of course, the larger the mismatch is, the more there will be applicants 
incurring costs but being left out of college, and it is then all the more important that the 
admissions mechanism works efficiently and with low costs.  
                                                 
7 Of course, with different weightings for the matriculation examination grades in different colleges, the 
student must then choose optimally the investment made in studying for the matriculation examination… 
A matriculation examination for which different colleges use different weightings is not quite a common 
entrance examination. 
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The transition from a system of college-specific entrance examinations to admissions 
based on matriculation examination (i.e. a common entrance examination) may help to 
reduce the costs of the admissions system to some extent, because it reduces the costs 
incurred by colleges in organizing the entrance examinations. However, as students have 
then stronger incentives to retake the matriculation examination and therefore cause 
additional costs in the high school sector, the overall effect on costs of the admission 
procedure is left uncertain. It is sometimes argued (e.g. OKM, 2016; Pekkarinen & 
Sarvimäki, 2016) that a common entrance examination provides a real possibility of 
applying to multiple competitive colleges in the same year, consequently leading to a 
better match of colleges and students. While this seems likely, the size of this effect 
depends on student preferences: whether or not they will accept their secondary choices 
or apply again in the future for their first preference. There is already some evidence that 
retaking of matriculation examinations has considerably increased (Yle, 2019 August 11). 
Analyzing the overall effect on costs is an important topic for future research.  
As indicated by the model of Hafalir et al. (2018), students may actually exert more effort 
in a system with a common entrance examination, meaning that there may be more 
studying time spent preparing for the common entrance examination than would be spent 
on the college-specific examinations. However, the policy maker may well prefer that 
outcome, as understanding of high school material may be seen as insufficient otherwise, 
while the knowledge learned studying for college-specific entrance examinations is seen 
as largely useless for most applicants (e.g. OKM, 2016). The matriculation examination 
grades of previous years are also usable in future admissions, and therefore the work of 
previous years is probably not lost so much as it is with college-specific entrance 
examinations.  
College-specific entrance examinations could still organized for those who have not 
completed a matriculation examination (or those who took their matriculation 
examination a long time ago), but should then be strictly reserved for them, as is already 
done in some colleges. Again, how many places are reserved for them requires a decision 
regarding how large a weight the policy maker assigns to the well-being of those who 
want to change their career path. 
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Many colleges may prefer to keep entrance examinations, because it enforces students to 
learn some of the subject material in advance. However, as in the models of Che and Koh 
(2016) and others, the admissions criteria set by the colleges need not be a one that 
maximizes the satisfaction of applicant preferences. The policy maker must decide on the 
weighting it gives to the autonomy of universities relative to student preferences. 
Learning the subject material also provides an introduction to the topic, which can lead a 
student to reassess her motivation.  
While learning one’s preferences is certainly too late at that point, it is fathomable that 
easier access to highly selective colleges may lead some students who performed very 
well in the matriculation examination to make choices that are soon regretted. It is an 
interesting and important question for future research whether the reform leads to more 
students changing their major after the first year. One obvious remedy to the problem is 
improving the information provided to high school students about possible college 
choices, preferably in a way that makes the students study the subject material in some 
way. However, if such college courses offered to high school students are given any large 
role in admittance, they will simply turn into very expensive college-specific entrance 
examinations. 
Some also assert that a college-specific entrance examination is a better way of revealing 
information on students’ capabilities, and while this is certainly true for some subjects 
(e.g. a school of musical arts), there is no evidence of it holding true more generally 
(Ahola & Spoof, 2019). In the end, the potential benefits need to be weighed against the 
costs. It is also claimed that entrance examinations help less popular colleges in yield 
control, but again, evidence is sparse.  
Matching colleges and students based on secondary education qualifications also means 
that choices made earlier in life have a larger role in deciding admission to higher 
education. While this is beneficial for encouraging good performance in high school, it is 
unclear what effect it will have on socioeconomic equity. As shown by Laukkonen (2018) 
and others, the socioeconomic status of parents may substantially affect the choice of 
education in the system of college-specific entrance examinations, for which costly 
preparation courses have been identified as one contributing reason. However, as Marks, 
Cresswell and Ainley (2006) discuss, system where students must lock their career path 
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earlier tends to show stronger correlation between socioeconomic status and student 
achievement. This is also another reason for not taking the satisfaction of reported 
preferences as an indicator of welfare without qualifications. 
We did not delve deeply into issues concerning decentralized college admissions, but 
while there is not much empirical research analyzing the effects of centralization, 
theoretical work seems to suggest that decentralized markets may not produce matchings 
that are efficient with respect to preferences of students. There is also well-known 
research (e.g. Roth & Xing, 1994, 1997) showing that some decentralized matching 
markets may be prone to unraveling, but it is outside of the scope of this study to consider 
the conditions under which that may happen. In the case of college admissions procedure 
like the Finnish one, this would mean that some colleges would decrease their 
commitment to the central marketplace and start searching for future students at earlier 
dates, before the students have even completed their matriculation examinations (much 
as in the case of the American early admissions procedures). We have not observed much 
of such behavior in Finland. One important advantage of a centralized mechanism with 
publicly known and objective admissions criteria is that it is likely to be less vulnerable 
to corruption and perceived as more fair. The recent scandals in the American college 
admissions highlight this point. 
As further topics for future work, it would be interesting to analyze the structure of labor 
supply that would result from setting the supply of education to more closely match the 
demand of education. More work on the relation between entrance examination scores 
and consequent academic performance would be beneficial, as would studying how the 
relation between socioeconomic background and academic attainment evolves during 
changes in the admissions procedures. More theoretical research on the relation between 
centralized and decentralized matching markets is also required, including a full 
characterization of the conditions under which a centralized clearinghouse would bring 
about a higher preference satisfaction for the students. It is also evident that analyzing 
college admissions models with exogenous college preferences is often insufficient. 
Rubinstein (2006) believes economic theory to be of very little practical use, at best a 
perfectionistic endeavor and at worst, a collection of fables with a morally corrupting 
influence on students of economics. While practical applications, such as the one 
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discussed in this work, highlight the contrast between the messiness of real mechanisms 
and elegant theory, it seems that at least the market design literature has found a way to 
make economic theory useful.  
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